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Abstract 
 This paper examines the causal factors underlying North Korea’s decision to use military 
actions against South Korean and U.S. personnel, both military and civilian, from the post-
Korean War until the present day. It tests hypotheses at the systemic, domestic, and individual 
levels of analysis and draws conclusions as to what forces and theories appear to explain North 
Korean behavior across three different leaders. It concludes that North Korea is largely 
leadership-driven and that there has been a shift away from military provocations since the time 
of Kim Il-Sung in favor of nuclear weapons development. 
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Introduction 
            North Korea is a state that has seemingly exists as a living anachronism in both its 
regional and the global environment at large. It appears to be the last true totalitarian state 
standing in the age of increasing global connectedness that shifted its focus inward and closed 
itself to the outside world. It has resisted pressures from its neighbors to join the world 
community wholeheartedly and seems to be content with remaining a recipient of aid, while also 
using fiery rhetoric and taking hostile action against its southern neighbor who is one of its 
largest suppliers of aid and investment in the last twenty years. The portrayal of North Korea in 
the media, especially in the last two years, has generally portrayed in terms being 
incomprehensible, childish, or buffoonish in nature in their actions towards the US, South Korea, 
and other actors in the region. At first glance, this behavior of receiving aid and then 
backpedalling on guarantees or acting in a hostile manner towards its patrons appears to be self-
defeating or shortsighted. Certainly, it is not difficult to label the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) as an unpredictable actor with undefined or rapidly changing goals that it 
haphazardly pursues over the course of a few months to a year.  
 However, within the context of history and not that of the 24-hour news cycle, these 
assumptions on the inherent nature of North Korea do not necessarily hold up to scrutiny. North 
Korea is the last Stalinist standing. It has survived the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union who heavily provided it with aid, a prolonged natural disaster in the 1990s, and the advent 
of advances mass communication and the Internet. In spite of sanctions, numerous reports of 
some of the worst human rights violations, and humanitarian disasters, the DPRK has not 
collapsed or fallen victim to civil war and political unrest. Instead, it has seemingly managed to 
survive the challenges that toppled other states of its kind. Considering this record, it stands to 
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reason that North Korea does operate on some form of a calculus or must do something correctly 
otherwise it would not have lasted as long as it has. Should these assumptions be true, it would 
also follow that if the underlying conditions driving this behavior could be understood, then an 
effective way of managing or engaging North Korea can be developed on the part of regional 
stakeholders, such as the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, Japan, and Russia. 
It is from this line of thinking that the interest in this thesis, which seeks to understand the 
trends of North Korean military provocations and the causal factors behind them, comes forth. 
There should be drivers of this behavior, which is at odds with international norms and the 
actions of its neighbors that should shed light on the underlying assumptions or goals of the 
DPRK, especially with the passage of time and leadership. Designed around answering the 
question of “why does North Korea use its military in a provocative manner against South Korea 
and the US,” this thesis aims to understand historical trends in North Korean behavior after the 
Korean War in to the present day across multiple leaders.  
Given North Korea’s close proximity to several major economic powers within the 
region, its decision to engage in provocative military behavior may have a destabilizing effect on 
the vital trade, ranging from automobiles to high-tech computing parts, which flows outward for 
consumption worldwide. Even with recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China 
Sea, North Korea’s willingness to attack military and civilian targets in South Korea poses the 
greatest risk to maintaining the peace within the region that has allowed it to flourish since the 
end of the Korean War. It is assured that a second sustained conflict in the Korean peninsula 
would be disastrous for both countries, regardless of which side emerged victorious. Similarly, a 
sudden, complete collapse of North Korea would also result in a humanitarian crisis that would 
significantly drain South Korean resources for decades to come. If the use of military 
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provocations holds predictive power for either scenario or injecting volatility into East Asian 
markets, it is highly important for policymakers to understand what drives these actions in the 
first place in order to formulate approaches that reduce the risk of further occurrence. 
No action occurs in a vacuum however and it is important to consider multiple factors 
that drive North Korean military provocations that are internal, either in reference to the 
conditions in country or the beliefs of the leader, or external in nature from a historical 
perspective. This thesis is structured in such a way to encapsulate these factors by defining 
variables at three levels of analysis, systemic, domestic, and individual, in the literature review 
and then providing two historical overviews of North Korean history with each level represented 
in those overview chapters. The analysis and conclusion sections will determine which variables 
hold with evidence provided in the overview justification sections. From there, this thesis seeks 
to gain an understanding of what causes North Korea to use provocations in order to better 
inform policymakers in their decision-making process. 
Literature Review 
            Answering the question “Why does North Korea decide to engage in military 
provocations against South Korea and United States?” begins at discussing what influences state 
behavior. Within the international relations community, there are three conventional levels of 
analysis that attempt to explain state behavior, the systemic, domestic, and individual levels, 
ordered from the most general to the most specific (Hudson 2005; Ransom 1968; Romanova 
2011; Singer 1961; and Waltz 1959). The intellectual basis for these levels derives from the 
works of Singer (1961) and Waltz (1959), who sought to create analytical models of analysis as 
they related to international relations and who examined the nature of war by defining three 
images conceptually equivalent to the aforementioned levels to explain the phenomenon.  
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The systemic level concerns where a given state or states fit within the broader context of 
an international system or systems and their interactions between each other.  It is effectively the 
most “comprehensive” level because it attempts to “encompass the totality of interactions which 
take place within the system and its environment” (Waltz 1959).  Essentially, the system itself 
and its characteristics determines how states act. However, since systems are inherently 
structural in nature, this level of analysis imposes a form of “uniformity” or “homogeneity” upon 
the actors, or nation-states. It tends to overstate the “impact of the system upon natural actors,” 
while also “discount[ing] the impact of the actors on the system” (Singer 1961).  As a result of 
its built-in broadness, there is very little interest in the internal differences between each actor.  
At the systemic level, the realist school of international relations argues that the existence of 
system wide anarchy creates international security crises because it forces states to provide for 
their own security independent of one another. However, the act of increasing one’s defensive 
capabilities only serves to be a destabilizing force as surrounding nations regard the buildup of 
arms with suspicion, prodding those neighbors to build up their arsenals as well and pursue 
alliances to counterbalance their neighbor, increasing the likelihood of war. Thus, the dynamic 
created by this “security dilemma” provides a justification for the systemic level Hypothesis 1 if 
a state is surrounded by neighbors it finds threatening to its security, it is more likely to engage 
in military provocations in an attempt to secure itself (Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978; Waltz 1988). 
            A second variable for systemic level causes of provocations comes in the form of 
regional bipolarity or multi-polarity, in which there are two great powers or more present in the 
region respectively. Pre-World War Two Europe is cited as a case of multi-polarity being a 
destabilizing force: prior to 1945, Europe experienced multiple small-scale wars and two world 
 10 
wars. In contrast, the post-1945 Cold War brought about several crises, but only two wars, the 
1974 Greco-Turkish War and the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary, neither of which 
threatened to expand beyond the two countries’ borders (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1998). Waltz 
(1998) explains the reason for the relative peacefulness of bipolar systems is rooted in the zero-
sum nature of threats in such systems: one side’s loss is the other side’s gain. As a result, the two 
major powers are more inclined to respond quickly to “unsettling events” to prevent losses than 
they are in a multipolar system where powers have less clearly defined interests. Thus, we derive 
Hypothesis 2, again at the systemic level: if a state is a junior or client actor in a bipolar system, 
it is more likely to not engage in military provocations as a result of pressure from its 
superpower patron than when it is an actor in a multipolar environment. 
The domestic level attempts to fill in this gap: it concerns itself with explaining how the 
internal features, such as organizations within the state and its national features, shape the 
behavior of a state. It assumes that each state is unique, beholden to a set of characteristics, 
which may be similar to or different from the characteristics of other states. These characteristics 
are inherently vast in nature, run the gamut of a state’s regime type, whether it is democratic or 
authoritarian, to its cultural characteristics and self-conception.  The organizations act as well, 
independent, in conflict, or in concert with other parts. As is with the systemic level, the 
domestic level is not without its own weaknesses. It potentially overstates the role of sub-
national actors and their characteristics. It also allows an observer to insert his or her own 
national bias into their analysis and highlight the “vices” of other nations, especially those that 
are in conflict the observer’s beliefs. Finally, it ignores the influence of individuals, particularly 
elites, in determining state behavior (Hudson 2005; Ransom 1968; Romanova 2011; Singer 
1961; and Waltz 1959).  
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Huntington (1993) puts forth a domestic-level theory that a country’s cultural and 
civilizational differences and similarities to its neighbors shaped how it would behave towards it 
neighboring countries. He neatly defines civilizations as regions that share common historical, 
cultural, and ideological ties, of which he defines three primary types, Western, Islamic, and 
Confucian, based on major civilizations in world history. From these civilizational cleavages, he 
argues that there is currently a global conflict between the West and other civilizations due to the 
unparalleled power of the West in the present day. In his view, the military and economic 
dominance of the West forced Islamic and Confucian sides closer together to balance the West 
based on arms transfer from East Asian states to Middle Eastern ones.  Using Huntington’s 
theory as a base, we derive Hypothesis 3: we expect a state to engage in military provocations 
towards other states which do not share a common cultural or civilization heritage with it and 
cooperative behavior towards countries in which those links were historically strong. 
Ajami (1993) disputes Huntington’s assertion, remarking that most states make more rational, 
economic calculations to improve their state’s market share in the world economy and thus do 
not have an interest in reviving historical glory.  In his view, economics drives state behavior 
rather than conscious civilizational clashes. Furthermore, he argues that subdivisions exist even 
within civilizations, citing Iranian support of “Christian Armenia” over Azerbaijan, a fellow 
Islamic state and Farsi-speaking state as an example. Thus, from the perspective of Ajami, the 
contrary Hypothesis 4 emerges: we expect a state not to engage in military provocations towards 
another state with whom it shares economic ties. 
            Thus, the individual level examines the role of decision-making elites in affecting 
the behavior of their state. Kelan (1965) notes that decision-makers, who are predominantly 
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elites within their given society, are shaped by their “social backgrounds, previous experience, 
and personal values,” that affect their thinking and process of decision-making. Their values, 
ideologies, and philosophies are viewed as a “relatively enduring orientation” and thus play a 
consistent role in the decisions they make and, by extension, those their organization or country 
makes. Moreover, these elites’ characteristics need not be biographical or historical; other factors 
such as being risk-acceptant or risk-averse in a given situation also influence an individual’s 
decision-making process. In short, the individual level of analysis examines the psychology of 
the leaders and their behavioral outcomes.  Like the previous two levels, this level is also subject 
to weaknesses. It is difficult to differentiate between an enduring value and a shifting attitude at a 
given moment in time. Decisions are not made in a temporal vacuum either: past experiences 
affect future choices and perceptions. Leaders themselves are also subject to the limitations 
imposed by the organizational structure in which they reside. The context and the timing of a 
situation may force a leader to make choices that may not be predictable based on their chosen 
ideology. Likewise, a leader’s perception of relative weakness or strength with regard to their 
own state or another state also guides decision-making.  Leaders may work collectively and thus 
may be influenced by their colleagues and peers (Burke 1966; Keller 2005; Kelman 1965; Jervis 
1992; and Price 1975). 
At this level, Keller (2005) discusses the role of individual leadership style in using force 
to mitigate a perceived crisis as a way of testing democratic peace theory, which asserts that 
democracies are more “pacific” in their relations with countries than autocracies. He divided 
leadership style into two categories, “constraint respecters” and “constraint challengers,” based 
on their sensitivity to domestic constraints.  The primary philosophical difference between the 
two is that the first group “internalize[s] constraints in their environments,” while the second 
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group “view constraints as obstacles to be overcome.”  His statistical findings of 154 cases found 
that constraint challengers and constraint respecters in autocracies, regardless of regime type, 
exhibited more “aggressive” or violent behavior than a democratic constraint respecter, the most 
pacific group, as a conflict resolution tool. The defining characteristics of a constraint challenger 
lie in the four categories of task emphasis need for power, distrust, and nationalism. Based on 
Keller’s definition, individuals with a task-emphasis mindset, as opposed to those with an 
interpersonal mindset, direct their attention to accomplishing a given task or achieving a mission 
instead of examining and contemplating other perspectives, making their leadership style one 
that emphasizes authority and obedience over compromise and accommodation. The need for 
power is defined by the perceived desire of the individual actor to heavily “influence, control, or 
dominate other people” in negotiating circumstances through a predominant focus on achieving 
maximal personal gains rather than joint positive outcomes. Leaders with a need for power often 
show a desire for centralized, hierarchical structures of governance and a willingness to use 
violence against domestic and systemic level opposition to their power (Keller 2005: 7).  Distrust 
refers to a given leader’s predisposition to perceive outside forces with an air of suspicion and 
fear of being taken advantage of in negotiations, leading to a belief system in which force is 
necessary to protect the interests of the state against these outside threats. Nationalism is a 
measure in which the leader perceives his or her state as exception or superior to those of other 
states and a heightened sense of vigilance against foreign threats and accepting the use of 
conflictual behavior as a means to protect the superiority of that state. Based on Keller’s work, at 
the individual level of analysis, it is relatively simple to determine Hypothesis 5 if a country’s 
leader fits the mold of a constraint challenger, he or she will be more willing to use military 
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provocations in their foreign policy decisions than a constraint respecter, regardless of regime 
type, in managing crises. 
A second individual level hypothesis comes from prospect theory, an alternative model to 
rational choice model of individual level decision-making, which asserts that individuals are risk 
averse when they perceive to be in the realm of gains and, conversely, risk acceptant when they 
perceive themselves within realm of losses. The theory continues to assert that aversion to 
continued losses creates an “endowment effect” in which the individual is unwilling to lose a 
current possession, even for a trade of comparable value (Betts 193-4; Levy 1996; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Levy (1996) took this economic model and then examined its applicability of 
prospect theory into international negotiating behavior. In particular, he found that states who 
perceive themselves in a losing situation, such as a “external decline” or “internal instability,” 
may  engage in increasingly risky actions, “short of war,” to maintain the status quo even if a 
basic cost-benefit analysis encourages “restraint.” For leaders, he found that since domestic 
publics punish leaders more for losses than they reward for gains, “decision-making elites” 
become risk acceptant and undertake “considerable efforts” to avoid losses. From prospect 
theory, Hypotheses 6, at the individual level, emerges: if a leader of a country perceives himself 
or herself to be within the domain of losses, then that leader will be more like to engage in risk-
acceptant military provocations in order to maintain the status quo. As a corollary, Hypothesis 7 
states that if a state faces internal insecurity, then they are more likely to engage in military 
provocations. 
 It is important to note that these levels of analysis are by no means comprehensive in 
nature or mutually exclusive. Rather their purpose is to structure observations of state behavior 
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and each individual level sheds light onto areas in which the others are deficient. They are, in a 
sense, a lens by which to view and organize observable phenomena. Moreover, it is possible to 
define and observe at a level between these three (Hudson 2005; Ransom 1968; Romanova 2011; 
Singer 1961; and Waltz 1959). 
 Now that a structure is given to a state’s behavior or behaviors, what are the 
characteristics behind the actual decision-making process? Kelman (1965) acknowledges the 
debate between whether foreign policy decision-making in the international community is 
inherently international in nature, implying states are actors interacting amongst one another or if 
it is intra-national in nature, that decisions are made within the state itself. In short, it is a debate 
between whether the state reacts to its external environment or that the state chooses act based 
the internal voices and actors within itself. He offers the following three factors to explain a 
decisional outcome and reconcile the two schools of thought: the occasion for the decision, 
personal characteristics of the decision-maker, and the organizational framework in which the 
decision-maker decides. Decisions are made at the intersection of external forces, labeled the 
occasion, internal forces, the values and experiences of the decision maker, and with an 
intermediate constraint between these forces, the organizational context.  These factors are 
roughly equivalent to the systemic, domestic, and individual levels of analysis. 
 Allison and Zelikow (1999) take a different approach and define three distinct models of 
the decision-making process named the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational 
Process Model (OPM), and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). Just as the levels of analysis 
are not mutually exclusive, their three models are meant to elucidate facets of the decision-
making process rather than provide three independent, all-encompassing perspectives. 
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 RAM is the dominant model within the academic, policy, and press circles for describing 
state behavior. It “attempt[s] to explain international events by recounting the aims and 
calculations of nations or governments” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p.13-5). Effectively, RAM 
forces “rational order” on state actions which would otherwise be “a mass of phenomena” that 
are otherwise “disconnected and unintelligible” without such a framework imposed upon them. 
This derives from the work of Morgenthau (1954), who explained the value of imposing a 
rational model on the foreign policy of nation-states precisely because doing so made the foreign 
policy of America, Britain, and Russia “appear as an intelligible, rational continuum” and 
“consistent…regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities 
of successive statesmen.” Allison and Zelikow (1999) agree with Morgenthau’s proposition and 
demonstrate that adding rationality to individual state action gives it the same quality of 
consistency regardless of the state’s relative power. 
 RAM defines its unit of analysis and principal actor as the government or nation-state and 
makes several assumptions. First, it assumes that the “nation or government” is “a rational, 
unitary decision-maker” and possesses only “one set of preferences, one set of choices, and a 
single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.” The state acts much in the 
same manner that an individual person does when RAM is applied in its original economic 
context: it responds to a problem, or rather a “strategic situation the actor faces.” It chooses the 
option that provides maximum benefit to its strategic goals, given the positive and negative 
consequences of that option compared to the alternatives. Thus, the analyst assumes that when a 
nation does an action, “that action must have been selected as the value-maximizing means for 
achieving the actor’s objectives.” The analyst then attempts to find the rationale, based on the 
value maximizing property, for a given decision and arranges evidence in such a way to confirm 
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the rationale. It is the analyst who assigns rules “for making assertions about governmental 
objectives, options, and consequences” (Allison and Zelikow 1999; and Monroe and Maher 
1995). 
 RAM is not without its criticism. Governments are not individual people and are a 
“conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a life of its own” and leaders perceive 
problems through “organizational censors.” As a result, unlike RAM that assumes a monolithic 
quality of the nation state, more closely aligned with the systemic level of analysis, OPM and its 
theoretical cousin, GPM, explain behavior based on the actions of the internal organizations 
within the state, aligning it conceptually closer with the domestic level of analysis.   
Allison and Zelikow (1999) assert in OPM that state, or government action, is not the 
result of a monolithic entity but rather as a sum of the routines that organizations within the 
government make. The organizations themselves are built around handling a certain set of tasks, 
are specially equipped to handle these tasks, and maintain a level of independence from the elite 
decision-makers.  Thus, executives are able to disrupt organizations, but are unable to actually 
control an organization’s behavior. Instead, the organization creates standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) to coordinate its human and technical capital and follows these procedures 
with predictable regularity.  These procedures assume that there are “standard” situations that the 
organization will consistently face and creates routines based on handling these specific 
situations.   However, this comes at the cost of being able to adapt to a unique circumstance or 
set of circumstances where a given SOP is inappropriate. Thus, the organization performs at a 
high level in circumstances that match assumptions of the SOPs and underperforms in critical 
junctions where circumstances do not fit the mold.   
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What truly differentiates it from OPM is the logic behind decision-making. OPM adheres 
to the “logic of appropriateness” whereas RAM adheres to the “logic of consequences.” That is, 
organizations in OPM behave according to established, familiar routines, regardless of the 
consequences instead of basing their actions on a cost-benefit analysis of potential options and 
choosing the one that maximizes benefits with the least amount of cost. 
 The final model, BPM, differentiates itself from OPM by assuming that organizations 
within a nation-state are “players” in competition with one another and that government action is 
a result of “compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal 
influence.”  No individual player is dominant and thus each player must bargain their way into 
an outcome that favors their motivations and goals. Thus the government is neither unitary nor 
an amalgamation of different organizations but a collection of players and a framework, or game, 
in which these players interact   These players need not be limited to individuals within executive 
positions of power or their subordinates: so-called ad hoc players are also permitted. Examples 
of these ad hoc players include “foreign diplomats” and members of interest groups. Action 
occurs along so called “action-channels,” or regular “means of taking a governmental action on a 
specific kind of issue.” The action-channel determines the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the players before the “game” itself begins, how the players enter the game, and which lower-
level players actually carry out the agreed-upon action. What determines a player’s impact is 
their power, derived from their formal authorities, control of resources, and ability to shape the 
bargaining process (Allison and Zelikow 1999; and Rosati 1981). 
 Rosati (1981) points out that there is a strong debate on how applicable this model is 
despite its popularity and concluded in his own work that it does not apply to policymaking as 
much as it is conceived to have done.  The leadership style of the president or highest executive 
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plays a role in determining how effective the model is and its results.  As opposed to criticisms 
that RAM is too simple, BPM is also viewed as overly complex (Christensen and Redd 2004; 
Krasner 1972; and Rosati 1981).  Krasner (1972) and Bendor and Hammond (1992) argue 
against the model by pointing out that it overstates the power of individual players versus the 
president to whom they owe their position and share values with. As they note, the president 
does not want to bargain with his subordinates. Additionally, there is little discussion on the 
impact of hierarchy in BPM.  The model also suffers from the weakness that it is inherently 
American in design and the examples within the literature reviewed here provide no example of 
using this model to describe another liberal democracy or describe an autocratic state. 
 With this theoretical background in mind, what then influences North Korean behavior? 
Within the systemic level of analysis, North Korea is a nation surrounded by large economic 
powers, namely China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and, by virtue of alliances rather than 
geography, the United States.  With the exception of Japan, all of the aforementioned nation-
states have occupied or placed troops on North Korean soil. To further compound the relative 
weakness of North Korea, three fifths of the nations are both nuclear with permanent seats on the 
United Nations Security Council. North Korea’s only defensive deterrent is the sheer size of its 
forces, position of its artillery that make an invasion too costly, and potential possession of a 
nuclear weapon.  Based on its external environment, ignoring the five’s internal characteristics, 
North Korea possesses good reason to fear its neighbors (Akaha 2002: 1-3; Buszynski 2009; 
Jager 2013; Kim 2011; and Lankov 2013). 
 At the domestic level, Meyers (2010) hypothesizes that North Korea is not actually a 
Communist or Confucian state, instead it conceives of itself in the cloak of Korean ethnic 
nationalism. Therefore, the purpose of North Korea’s leader is to be the quintessential Korean 
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rather than a true intellectual counterweight to Marx, Lenin, or Mao. Lankov (2013) supports this 
proposition of the Korean national character and mentions the historical “de-Stalinization” that 
Kim Il-Sung underwent during his forty-six year reign. He, as well as Meyers (2010) and Hassig 
and Oh (2009) paint a rather dire internal economic climate. North Korea itself possesses few 
natural resources and an obsolete manufacturing base. It acknowledges its loss in the cold war 
for economic dominance in the Korean peninsula within its own internal propaganda, yet 
tenaciously justifies being legitimate by virtue of being the more purely Korean of the two 
Koreas.  
 At the individual level, the North Korean leadership fears that the breakdown of the 
information corridor will lead to a popular uprising. This gives them both a suspicion and innate 
fear of “opening up” based both the perception that it would have an analogous effect of regime 
change that it did in the final days of the Soviet Union and the fact that they would find few 
places to flee to given South Korea’s history of prosecuting its former dictators (Scalapino 2002: 
20-21; Lankov 2013; Kim 2011; and Meyers 2010). 
 Within Allison’s three types Lankov (2013) and Meyers (2010) make the case that North 
Korea is inherently rational in nature, if not the most rational when compared to the five 
neighboring powers. They define North Korea’s motivations as simple: Pyongyang wishes only 
to survive and obtain aid with the fewest concessions possible. The use of its military and 
incendiary rhetoric to antagonize the South and the US is actually part of a tried-and-true tactic 
of escalation and then de-escalation to extract aid from both countries at the negotiating table. 
For the reasons mentioned above, its decision to maintain a closed to society also fits within a 
rational mindset. Since there is an established historical precedent for such provocations, an 
application of the Organizational Process Model is also plausible. More research is needed to see 
 21 
if Allison’s third model applies given the fact that Kim family is not subject to electoral concerns 
and the elites in the country are connected to the Kims through shared history and blood ties and 
thus share the same concerns and motivations as them. 
Methods 
 This thesis will utilize a case-study format to analyze trends present from the period of 
1953 to present divided by the reign of Kim Il-Sung (1953-1994) and the reigns of Kim Jong-il 
and Kim Jong-un (1994-present), each of which will be covered by a historical overview section 
describing relevant events at the . Due to the relative brevity of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un’s 
reigns when compared to Kim Il-Sung’s, the former are combined into one for the sake of 
creating a period of comparison that is closer in length to latter. Moreover, combining the rule of 
the two most recent leaders provides an opportunity to overcome the information or analytical 
gaps that would come about as a result of looking at each period holistically. In the case of Kim 
Jong-il, his period in power, there is a gap between explaining policy events that happened 
toward to the end of death that may be tied toward setting up his son, Kim Jong-un, as the heir 
apparent. In the case of Kim Jong-un, the absolute brevity of his time as leader of North Korea, 
from 2011 to present, is incredibly short and there is insufficient information at present to 
provide a robust analysis that is sufficiently removed from the present day. Moreover, certain 
foreign policy considerations and domestic conditions present in Kim Jong-il’s period are likely 
to carry over into Kim Jong-un’s calculus, especially in the rushed manner in which he became 
the successor, which is explained, in greater depth in the corresponding historical analysis 
chapter. 
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 The term “provocation” is defined to include armed invasion; border violations; 
infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnaping; terrorism (including assassination 
and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; 
and incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government. This definition is based 
upon the work of Fischer (2007) and Nanto (2003) in their compilation of North Korean military 
provocations although it intentionally does not include rhetoric or missile tests. 
 Angry rhetoric and nuclear weapons development are intentionally not considered 
provocative actions despite the validity of an argument that these actions are, in fact, provocative 
in their real-world effects. However, including North Korean nuclearization and fiery anti-South 
Korean and anti-US rhetoric is a field of rich, well-developed scholarly and foreign policy debate 
unto itself at the present day. Thus, by including these actions, which do not directly threaten 
lives in the immediate manner that bombings and bullets do, within thesis’ operational definition 
of military provocations would expand the scope into a size that is not suitable for an 
undergraduate thesis. Limiting the scope maintains the thesis’ structural integrity; however, these 
topics may be later revisited as points of further research and study. 
Finally, the primary source of information regarding North Korean military provocations 
lies in the Library of Congress reports written by Nanto (2003) and Fischer (2007) with the ROK 
Cheonnan sinking (BBC 2010b)  and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (BBC 2010a) also 
included due to their profile in recent years. While these reports do not contain every military 
incident in the history of DPRK-ROK relations, is useful in determining which actions were 
considered of high importance to the United States such that they were included in a document 
originally intended for members of Congress. The operational definition of incident will be 
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applied to the contents contained therein in order to determine the number of incidents per year 
to identify periods of variation.   
For historical analysis, this thesis primarily draws on the work of Andrei Lankov, Dr. 
Michael Seth, Dr. Victor Cha, Sheila Jager, and Dr. Meyers. These sources are considered to be 
leading experts in the field of North Korea studies or have served on the National Security 
Council to formulate policy on North Korea and negotiated with North Korean officials.  In a 
field where there is little firsthand information available, these scholars and officials have 
performed the highest quality of research. They have been recommended to me by the thesis 
committee, who testify to these individuals’ eminence within the field. Sources that were not 
recommended by my committee I have used, albeit more cautiously and generally in areas where 
they corroborate information that provided by the primary sources. 
Hypotheses List 
Systemic: 
Hypothesis 1: if a state is surrounded by neighbors it finds threatening to its security, it is more 
likely to engage in military provocations in an attempt to secure itself. 
Hypothesis 2: if a state is a junior or client actor in a bipolar system, it is more likely to not 
engage in military provocations as a result of pressure from its superpower patron than when it 
is when it is an actor in a multipolar environment. 
Domestic: 
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Hypothesis 3: we expect a state to engage in military provocations towards other states that do 
not share a common cultural or civilization heritage with it and cooperative behavior towards 
countries in which those links were historically strong. 
Hypothesis 4: we expect a state to not engage in military provocations towards another state 
with whom it shares economic ties. 
Hypothesis 7: if a state faces internal insecurity, then they are more likely to engage in military 
provocations. 
Individual: 
Hypothesis 5: if a country’s leader fits the mold of a constraint challenger, he or she will be 
more willing to use military provocations in their foreign policy decisions than a constraint 
respecter, regardless of regime type, in managing crises. 
Hypotheses 6: if a leader of a country perceives himself or herself to be within the domain of 
losses, then that leader will be more like to engage in risk-acceptant military provocations in 
order to maintain the status quo. 
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Analysis of Kim Il-Sung’s Reign 
Overview   
The greatest period of variation in military provocations in North Korea’s history in the 
early 1960s and the period from the late 1970s to late 1980s takes place under the leadership of 
Kim Il-Sung, whose forty-year reign spans from the beginning to the ending of the Cold War.  
His impact on North Korea is both absolute and far-reaching. Both his son and grandson, his 
successors in dynastic leadership, invoke the policies and images of the revolutionary founder 
during their own tenure. To adequately understand the world that Kim Il-Sung operated in, it is 
imperative to consider the systemic, domestic, and internal factors that drove his decisions.  
However, there are two corollary notes to consider when evaluating the levels of analysis 
driving North Korean behavior during this period. First, there is significant overlap between the 
domestic and individual levels given the structure and absolute control that Kim Il-Sung held 
during his tenure. That to say that it is reasonable to view North Korean domestic policy as Kim 
Il-Sung’s policy or, at the very least, approved by the Dear Leader himself. Second, due to the 
intense rivalry between the ROK and the DPRK combined with Kim’s desire for reunification, it 
is useful to consider South Korean conditions within the domestic level as they undoubtedly 
played a role in determining North Korea’s domestic policies. 
Levels of Analysis 
Systemic 
 Kim Il-Sung began his reign during the Cold War at time when the war-era cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the United States slid down into a full competition for global 
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hegemony. Understanding the systemic conditions of the Kim Il-Sung necessitates an 
understanding of the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s respective strategic goals and actions 
during the Cold War. South Korea and North Korea, as the respective client states of these 
powers, are components of these superpowers’ larger objectives, played out on a global scale. 
In the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union was forced to recalculate its 
imperialist assumptions about the pre-World War II powers, who shifted from colonial ambitions 
to desiring security guarantees under an American umbrella. This shift, in the eyes of the Soviet 
planners, amounted to the creation a unipolar capitalist world with the United States at its helm. 
Such an environment would be more dangerous to the USSR than the multi-polarity of the 
prewar period, which conferred a security benefit to the Soviet Union by allowing it to balance 
Western industrial powers through playing powers off one another. The united front in the 
aftermath of World War II completely eliminated this dynamic, creating an easily identifiable us 
versus them mentality on the part of the Soviets, who sought to export the Communist revolution 
(Westad 2007: 56-59).  
 To counter this threat, the USSR created buffers in Eastern Europe by providing military 
assistance to local Communists in “Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria” 
and made it clear to those local leaders that successfully creating a Communist state required the 
support of the Soviet Union and its military (Westad 2007: 59). At the same time, the Soviet 
Union used its military occupation of East Germany to install a sympathetic Communist regime 
in therein. The Soviet-backed locals cemented power through terror and elimination of political 
opposition in those countries and the Soviet Union later borrowed these tactics in its later 
territorial expansions into the Third World, including unsuccessful forays into North Africa and 
Iran (Westad 2007: 60-61).   
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 Unlike the Eastern European states, Chinese Communists established decisive control 
over the mainland without following Stalin’s instructions, which included establishing peace 
with the Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. This increased Stalin’s suspicion of Mao and his 
commitment to Communism, especially based on China’s level of development and its 
aberrational path toward socialism. As a result, Stalin remained skeptical of the Chinese 
Communists’ authenticity, negotiating in such a way that placated the USSR’s security concerns 
without forming an actual alliance between the two states and laid the groundwork of North 
Korea’s policy of playing the two off one another for aid. The military and political victories of 
Communist states, including China, and initial struggles of the capitalist West in their postwar 
protectorates created an optimism in Stalin towards the prospects of Communist military action, 
leading to the approval of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in the 1950s (Jager 2013: 
54-63; Lankov 2013: 6-10; Westad 2007: 64-68). 
 Stalin’s successor, Krushchev, took a more accepting attitude towards China in order to 
create an international socialist community in the late 1950s and went as far as to create a 
Marshall Plan-like aid program for China. Like Stalin, Krushchev was rebuffed by Mao after the 
acceptance of due to the plan effectively forcing China to emulate the Soviet model. Mao, 
countered with a plan of his own that sought to achieve faster progress along the Communist 
stages of development, The Great Leap Forward. By the early 1960s, the split became readily 
apparent as confrontation between the two states increased despite personal visits by Krushchev 
to rectify the situation. In 1965, the cooling came to a near freeze as both sides attacked the 
other’s policies. As a result of this internecine diplomatic struggle between superpowers within 
the international Communist sphere, the USSR’s grip on North Korea weakened while it 
competed for legitimacy against China (Lankov 2013: 27-29; Westad 2007: 69-72). 
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 Given North Korea’s timeline of using its military to attack the South, it is safe to assume 
that at least of the military provocations during Kim Il-Sung’s reign is positively correlated with 
periods in which it is relatively independent from the dominance of superpowers or when those 
powers are in conflict with one another. Soviet and Chinese dominance of the DPRK in terms of 
its domestic affairs reached their zenith prior to the beginning of the Korean War and declined 
over time as is as described in the following sections. The circumstances leading up to the 
Korean War underscore how hamstrung North Korea was at the time: it took stupendous efforts 
and manipulation by North Korea to persuade both Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China that war 
was viable and could be successful. As a client state of the USSR, the DPRK largely acted in its 
patron’s interests. As an independent ally, North Korea proved able and willing to take part in 
self-interested actions that without the consideration of its militarily superior partner (Jager 2013: 
60-62).  
 The Sino-Soviet Split strengthened North Korea because it forced both powers to 
compete against each other rather than united on collective security issues. North Korea’s 
position as a buffer for both the Chinese and Russian borders against the American forces in 
South Korea makes it an ideal location for shared security interests. Thus, when both powers had 
a close relationship, their mutual security interest in border security doubled the pressure that 
they placed on North Korea. However, in times of conflict between each other, both powers 
needed to vie for the loyalty of North Korea in order to prevent North Korea from increasing 
territorial reach of their enemy.  
This new paradigm places North Korea in a position of strength in negotiating since it 
can play the competing interests of both sides off of one another for both aid and increased 
autonomy with little risk. North Korea, as well as China and Russia, effectively understands that 
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any attempt to seize control of it on the part of either side is riskier than engaging in a bidding 
war for North Korean loyalty. To provide a concrete example, a Russian intervention at that time 
in North Korea would have heightened Chinese anxiety and escalated the already high tensions 
and the same phenomenon would be observed if the roles were reversed.  Thus, both powers are 
forced to knowingly enter into a dynamic of paying off the DPRK rather than potentially subject 
themselves to a more costly scenario by not securing neutrality. North Korea understood its 
position and used it effectively to achieve the independence from both powers needed to achieve 
its localized objective of reunification with the flexibility to use its military in this endeavor 
(Lankov 2013: 11-21). 
 The Soviet Union did not allow its conflict with China to prevent the establishment of 
more peaceable relations with its chief rival, the United States. From 1968 to 1975, the two 
countries pursued a policy of détente by acknowledging the vested interests of other superpower 
in order to counteract the global disorder present at the time. Both countries were vested in the 
process: the backlash against military intervention in Vietnam led the United States to improve 
its image through diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union sought 
to secure itself against China after a series of border incidents nearly led to war. The de-
escalatory value of détente manifested itself several times in times of conflict between Soviet and 
American backed states, most notably the Yom Kippur War of 1973 in which neither side put 
boots on the ground to influence the course of the conflict (Westad 2007: 195-202).  Détente 
effectively came to a close in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the Soviets intervened in the 
Third World, particularly in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. The United States interpreted these 
actions as unvarnished attempts to expand the Soviet sphere and responded strongly in turn by 
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shutting off aid to Soviet states and aiding anti-Soviet forces within the country (Westad 2007: 
280-81, 323).  
 Soviet focus away from East Asia and rapprochement with the United States reinforced 
the North Korean security dynamic because it created further constraints on Soviet action and 
strengthened North Korea’s position. With the front of the Cold War shifting to the developed 
world that did not include the DPRK for reasons described in subsequent sections, the USSR no 
longer possessed the either the political leverage or the resources to expend on North Korean 
relations without reallocating resources necessary for its more immediate and pressing concerns 
in the Third World to a more provincial concern in the East.  However, it given its high tensions 
with China, the USSR still needed to prevent the Chinese threat from gaining an advantage by 
becoming closer with the North. Thus, North Korea maintained its bargaining position even 
though it disapproved of Russian engagement with the United States and continued the dynamic 
through this period. The North Korea vacillation between its alliances to both countries over this 
twenty year period is further proof of it saw the competition between the USSR and China as 
beneficial to maintaining its own independence to pursue localized goals in the way it saw fit 
(Kim 2002: 112-114; Lankov 2013: 19-21; Seth 2011: 347-49). 
Moreover, the fact that rapprochement saw Cold War action moving away from East Asia 
may also play a factor in preventing North Korean provocations. The assassination attempt on 
President Park Chung Hee occurred in 1968, as did the other most brazen provocations of that 
period which occurs during the beginning of the détente period. Alternatively, North Korea 
began a period of engagement with Non-Aligned countries in the 1970s and eventually joined the 
movement as part of its efforts to expand its global legitimacy against South Korea and isolate its 
rival. North Korea may have shifted away from military provocations in this period as part of a 
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larger strategy to maintain an advantage with its growing rival whose development was 
beginning to catch up and had a stronger diplomatic presence globally. From a systemic 
perspective in the North Korean calculus, high provocations during this time could have 
undermined its efforts for recognition at the world stage (Lankov 2013: 31; Kim 2011: 103; 
Nanto 2003; Seth 2011: 349-50). 
The third potential reason for North Korea’s reason for abandoning provocations may 
also be explained by the foreign policy actions of the United States towards China, with whom 
North Korea had closer ideological ties. President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, leading 
to a thaw in the historically antagonistic Sino-American relationship of the Cold War era. Seeing 
Beijing negotiate with its foe whom it had been strongly against in its propaganda may have 
caused North Korean leadership to rethink their strategic calculus, at least temporarily, and 
engage diplomatically with South Korea to achieve their reunification goal. The historical record 
indicates that this may have been the case at one point: there was a 1972 communique between 
the two Koreas, similar to its Shanghai cousin, calling for increased cooperation. The calculus 
shift did not last very long however: the 1976 axe incident where North Korean soldiers killed 
two American servicemen reignited local tensions (Lankov 2013: 31; Kim 2011: 103; Nanto 
2003; Seth 2011: 349-50; Westad 2007: 280-81, 323). 
 The Cold War winded down under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev who wound 
down Soviet commitments in Afghanistan while increasing progressively increasing engagement 
with the United States from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. The cost of Soviet 
interventionism, coupled with its internal inefficiencies proved to be its undoing. With the 
internal collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War milieu which Kim Il-Sung’s matured in came 
to a close (Lankov 2013: 213; Westad 2007: 380-83). 
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As North Korea reached its developmental zenith and decline, South Korea began its rise 
at the expense of its democracy. In 1961, junior military officers who graduated in the Korean 
Military Academy in 1949 and served together in the Korean War, overthrew the Republic of 
Korea’s democratic government and installed General Park Chung Hee as a leader of the state. 
The impetus for the coup d’état came from both a desire to purge corrupt senior military officials 
and concerns over a burgeoning leftist movement among “labor, students, and teachers” (Seth, 
2011: 378-79). Park saw the South’s lack of development compared the high levels of 
development in its North Korean and Japanese neighbors as a form of weakness. He also viewed 
the ROK’s heavy reliance on the United States for aid as enhancing that weakness. In a similar 
style to Kim Il-Sung and the Meiji rulers at the turn of the twentieth-century, he embarked on a 
plan of state-directed growth. The results were stunning: the first Five Year Plan of 1961 
averaged 8.9%. Although the US forced Park to scale back his political control in the mid-1960s, 
he expanded trade with the United States and established trade relations with despite strong 
public opposition. His leadership continued to spur economic growth in the following decade 
with double-digit growth (Seth 2011: 383-89). 
 Despite Park’s assassination in 1979 and the increasing leadership challenges from 
student movements that lead to Chun Doo Hwan’s ousting in 1987 and a return to democratic 
rule, South Korea continued to prosper in the 1980s (Seth 2011: 410-18). After a brief 
inflationary shock in in 1980, the ROK economy continued to grow rapidly reaching a peak 
growth rate of 12% from 1986-1988 (Seth 2011: 394-95). Outside of its growth numbers, the 
crowning moment of South Korea’s ascendance into First World status was hosting the 1988, 
which not only sealed its prestige, but also cemented its place ahead of North Korea (Cha 2012: 
118-19). 
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Domestic 
 In 1946, it was immediately clear that the division between the Soviet-occupied North 
and the American-occupied South was rapidly reaching a state of permanence due to the conflict 
between the two powers over how to merge the two territories together politically. Much of the 
intransigence, especially on the Soviet side, which prevented reunification is understandable 
given the ground conditions at the time: the American-backed administration enjoyed far less 
political support from the local population than did the Soviet occupiers. In part, this is due to the 
American utilization of individuals and groups that were highly connected to the Japanese 
colonial regime as administrators in the day-to-day operations of government. The North, in 
comparison, heavily utilized the indigenous population to fulfill functionary needs. The 
American regime itself was also weakened by political instability caused by leftist factions in 
South Korea. The Soviets, seeing themselves in a position of strength, elected to stall 
negotiations by setting unacceptable preconditions in order to achieve a better bargaining 
position in the future (Jager 2013: 35-40; Lankov 2013: 9; McEachern 2010: 55). 
 In 1950, amidst the backdrop of a Soviet drawdown, Kim Il-Sung shared his patron 
state’s optimism on the prospects of an eventual victory against the American-backed South and 
the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the leadership of a single political entity (Lankov 
2013: 10-26).  At the time, it was immediately obvious to observers that the North Korean 
People’s Army (NKPA) had better training and equipment that their South Korean counterparts. 
NKPA further benefited from Soviet military assistance in the form of advisors, the vast majority 
of whom were lieutenant colonels and veterans of the Eastern front in World War II. China 
further bolstered the ranks of the NKPA by allowing the transfer of “tens of thousands of ethnic 
Koreans” who were veterans of Mao’s forces in the “Chinese civil war” (Jager 2013: 60-61). In 
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addition to assuming a swift victory against an inferior opponent, Kim was convinced that the 
Americans would not intervene despite contrary opinions and warnings from Mao and Stalin 
(Jager 2013: 61-62). 
 The North Korea initiated-push to engage in military conflict with South Korea based on 
assumptions of eminent victory is reflected in later periods of high provocations. This suggests 
that there is a strong correlation between the two and a probable causal link. North Korea will 
use its military in times when it can be assured of actual success or a lack of consequences. 
There is a distinct link between its Korean War assumptions toward the prospects of American 
retaliation and its willingness to engage in minor border incidents in the 1970s that directly 
ended the lives of the American military such as the 1976 Hatchet Incident. In the first case, 
North Korea assumed that the United States would not retaliate if South Korea was attacked and 
would negotiate instead. If those assumptions were true, it would have largely assured a North 
Korean victory against the poorly equipped and ill-prepared South Korean army. Over thirty 
years later, it continued to escalate tensions against US and ROK forces when it felt confident 
that those forces would not retaliate. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that North Korean 
provocations during the Kim Il-Sung era are influenced by its perceptions of a victory or 
minimal consequences and that its goals during this period were consistent with the objective of 
the complete reunification of peninsula that drove the Korean War. In addition to achieving 
geopolitical goals, this victory would have further legitimized Kim Il-Sung’s personality cult, 
which relied upon him being the ultimate embodiment of Korean-ness and the protector of the 
Korean people. There may also be element of prospect theory at work: North Korea is inclined to 
engage in conflictual behavior at times when it perceives its enemies, the United States and 
South Korea, to be risk-averse (Jager 2013: 60-62; Meyers 2010: 74-80; Seth 2011: 349-50).  
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 The decision to go to war based on Pollyanna assumptions of victory from North Korean 
leadership proved to be a costly error. North Korea suffered the brunt of intensive bombing 
campaigns by General MacArthur’s forces, which obliterated its pre-Korean War infrastructure 
and industrial advantages the North held over the South. In the aftermath, North Korea focused 
heavily on rebuilding its industry and re-industrializing until the early 1960s. These efforts 
highly successful in part because Imperial Japan concentrated industrial development of the 
Korean colony in mineral-rich regions that later came to be occupied by the Soviets. Thus, the 
recovery focused primarily on reusing and building off of Japanese plans instead of building 
entire industries from scratch. In the later stages of its recovery, North Korea focused on the 
development of heavy industrial needed for military readiness in case of a future war of 
reunification. This sharply contrasted with the Soviet Union who took a more balanced approach 
toward development in the post-Stalin era (Seth 2011: 340-43). 
 Domestically, the recovery efforts increased North Korean independence from the Soviet 
Union, especially when compared to the ROK who used American aid for half of its national 
budget during the same time period. By 1960, North Korea achieved a tangible form of 
independence from the two Communist superpowers economically and militarily: Soviet aid 
consisted of a measly 2.6% of North Korean revenues and the People’s Liberation Army ended 
its occupation two years prior (Seth 2011: 342-43).  
 The actions of North Korea in the immediate post-war period suggest that when the state 
focuses itself on rebuilding, it naturally is disinclined to engage in conflictual behavior compared 
to times when its economy is expanding or contracting. This is a rational calculation: North 
Korea did not have the capacity to fight a second Korean War in the 1950s due to the devastating 
effects of the war. Continuing hostilities would have only prolonged the recovery process at best 
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and potentially be regime changing at worst. This reinforces the hypothesis that North Korea 
engages in conflictual behavior when it believes that its chances for success are high since it also 
does not engage in such behavior when it perceives the prospects for failure to be low.  
 In addition to perceiving a low likelihood of success, the lack of strong conflictual 
behavior also coincides at time when North Korea heavily leaned on the Soviet Union and China 
for aid and development, which suggests a moderating influence by the superpowers. Given the 
presence of Chinese troops in North Korea until late 1950s, a resumption of the hostilities would 
not have only led to a reversal of the industrialization progress North Korea made, but it also 
risked either alienating Chinese and Soviet donors while also increasing the likelihood that 
Mao’s armies would remain on North Korean soil and directly threatened North Korean 
sovereignty in the long run. Kim Il-Sung alluded to the difficulties of having Mao’s troops in and 
near North Korea in a conversation with Eastern bloc diplomats thirty years after the fact, 
underscoring the friction that the presence of these troops caused during their sojourn in the 
DPRK (Cha 2012: 23; Lankov 2013:18-19; Seth 2011: 340-43).  
 The success of the 1950s continued briefly into the 1960s and then began a prolonged 
period of decline. In 1962, the perception that the Soviets capitulates to the Americans during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis shook North Korean confidence in its ally’s security umbrella. This feeling 
of insecurity was magnified by the South Korean military government’s hardline stance against 
communism, leading the North to focus up to 30% of domestic production toward military 
support. Bureaucratic opposition, which supported the development of consumer products, was 
systematically removed. The economic decline speaks for itself. Both the Seven Year Plan of 
1961 and the Six Year Plan of 1971 were extended by three years and one year respectively, 
indicating a failure to reach developmental targets. Despite slowing down in the 1970s, North 
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Korea kept itself at a level of development superior to that of the South in the eyes of outside 
observers. However, from 1986 onward in the twilight of Kim Il-Sung’s reign, the reached its 
hard limits of its “command economy” (McEachern 2010: 58; Seth 2011: 364-67).  
North Korea’s rise and decline, which coincide with periods of heightened hostilities that 
it initiated, discredit the notion that economic development leads to peace or declining tensions. 
In the 1960s, the North far exceeded the South in its economic development, yet it made serious 
attempts on the life of the South Korean president and captured the USS Pueblo. However, in the 
1980s, when the South outstripped North Korea in the economic development race, North Korea 
engaged in terrorism abroad against South Korean targets, including President Chun Doo Hwan. 
Given the presence of the same action occurring into different economic states, it is unlikely for 
economic development to possess an explanatory capacity with regard to North Korean military 
provocations.  
However, these actions may be influenced by factors in South Korea itself. Both periods 
of military provocations and terrorism occurred in times of social unrest in South Korea against 
the government. Park Chung Hee came into power when there was strong Leftist protest 
movement and a similar type of movement toppled Chun Doo Hwan. Therefore, the presence of 
popular anti-government movements in South Korea likely influenced Kim Il-Sung to consider 
military options as a viable solution to reunify the peninsula. North Korea may have perceived 
such movements as indicators on an oncoming socialist movement, even if the aims of the leftist 
movement were far less ambitious than the DPRK perceived them to be. 
Individual 
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Kim Il-Sung’s political legitimacy derived from his World War II reputation as a 
guerrilla fighter and his Soviet patronage of him because of its failure to install a sympathetic 
leader from the indigenous Communist Party. Neither he, nor any of his comrades, were 
educated in actual governance and took a suspicious view of intellectuals. This distrust of the 
intelligentsia manifested itself in the form of multiple purges “before, during, and after” the 
Korean War” (McEachern 2010: 53-57). He did not tolerate opposition in any form and 
effectively divided and conquered his opponents, many of whom had helped build the Korean 
Communist Party. Lankov (2013) notes that only one elderly member of the ten member 1949 
Politburo, with the exception of Kim Il-Sung, died of old age: the rest fell to purges in the 1950s 
(12-15).  In addition to intellectual elites, the ranks of the purges of the 1950s and 1960s 
included Koreans with Soviet and Chinese connections, no matter how strong or real those 
connections were. By the end of the 1960s, leadership in the Korean Workers Party largely 
consisted of Kim’s comrades from his guerrilla days and those with familial ties to those 
comrades and the Kim family (Lankov 2013: 14-15; McEachern 2010: 53-57; Seth 2011: 344-
48). 
The greatest periods of hostile actions against the South come at times when Kim’s 
power is absolute. This indicates that his level of control is positively correlated with his 
willingness to engage in terror. When Kim felt constrained by opposition, he focused his 
energies on removing perceived threats rather redirecting his opponents and the people towards 
the patriotic goal of reunification. In contrast, he used military provocations when he perceived 
his position as secure from usurpation. Thus, it is safe to postulate that he used terror as a tool 
when he knew that he would not face major consequences if these efforts resulted in failure due 
to the supportive makeup of the Korean Communist Party. 
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The second major characteristic of Kim Il-Sung’s personality was his determination to 
reunify the peninsula. Despite the Korean War being both a complete military rout and an utter 
annihilation of North’s industrial base, Kim never gave up hope for reunification. Ironically, he 
managed to use the Korean War, a failed military adventure of his own design and initiative, to 
strengthen his power and become the unquestionable leader of North Korea. His perception that 
the war for reunification was, in fact, a winnable one led to equally optimistic calculations of a 
popular Leftist revolution beginning in South Korea. In fact, the two greatest moments of 
military provocations directly coincide with flashes of anti-government protest movements in 
South Korea. This suggests that his desire create a Communist Korean peninsula shaped 
belligerent policy: he used terrorism at times when he thought that prospects of a revolution were 
at their best with the hope of sparking one (Seth 2011: 352-53).  
Moreover, it shows his propensity to interpret pleasant noise as signal: each of his 
military ventures into the South, including Korean War, ended in failure with none of the initial 
objectives achieved despite a wholehearted belief in the chances of success. It is plausible that 
these two factors worked in tandem to promote military provocations during his regime. The 
rosy and flawed assumptions that lead to provocative policy actions are accentuated from the 
lack of a moderating force. Without the presence of individuals in positions of power who could 
dissuade Kim from taking disruptive actions as a result of his unwillingness to tolerate dissent, 
state policy mimics his whims no matter how flawed they are. 
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Analysis of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un’s Rule 
Overview  
The brief reigns of Kim Jong-il and his son, Kim Jong-un, mark the beginning of a 
permanent shift into decline within the North Korean state because of both internal and external 
factors, which undermined the governance model that Kim Il-sung built. This period also marks 
a shift in DPRK policy away from using the military to guarantee state security and the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and missiles to deter an attack from the outside world. North Korea has 
benefited from certain South Korean presidents who shifted policy away from suspicion and a 
desire to counter the North Korean military with aid based engagement.  As leaders, both of Kim 
Il-sung’s successors face similar constraints and a need to build support bases to maintain their 
control over the DPRK. Given the relative brevity of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un’s respective 
reigns when compared to the near half century of Kim Il-Sung, the analysis for their regimes will 
be combined. 
Levels of Analysis 
Systemic 
 Kim Jong-il came into power in 1994, a highly transitional period in global order 
precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to the current dynamic of the present day. In the 
United States, William Clinton defeated then-President George H.W. Bush in 1992, effectively 
ending the career of the last Cold War-era president. President Clinton maintained an 
international outlook to pursue American economic development through the “enlargement of 
liberal, free enterprise regimes” (Young & Kent 2005; 609-614). The coherency of Clinton’s 
policies during tenure came into question as the United States intervened in several conflicts in 
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Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, which strained US resources. As a result, he developed policies 
for future humanitarian interventions that clarified American objectives and made a clear path 
for exiting the conflicts. Unlike the Cold War, in which the United States focused on defeating 
an external enemy, American foreign policy in the 1990s started out focusing on the creation of a 
“New World Order” that strengthened international institutions under the first Bush 
Administration and then thereby shifted to containing localized conflicts under the Clinton 
Administration (Young & Kent 2005; 610-612). 
 The initial trend in American foreign policy came as part of a global trend toward 
globalization in which the importance of individual states decreased in comparison to regional 
and growing interregional connectedness in the form of trade, immigration, and idea exchange 
(Young & Kent 2005; 610-612). Cronin (2014) notes that while the initial goal of the new 
system was to create a “rules-based system that was supposed to function more or less 
automatically,” the emphasis on markets, democracy, and human rights had the capacity to be 
“very intrusive” because of increased international scrutiny in a state’s domestic politics (244). 
As a result, there was an unexpected shift toward force-based intervention under various policies 
such as the “the responsibility to protect,” “nation-building,” and “antiterrorism,” which later 
came to hurt North Korea when it was labeled a state sponsor of terror during the George W. 
Bush Administration. Unlike previous administrations, the Bush Administration took steps 
beyond sanctions that were aimed at North Korean elites and the cash that was used to acquire 
perks and luxury goods through overseas banking. In one particular incident, the US pressured 
Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank, into freezing over $25 million in North Korean assets.  
While further worsening US-DPRK relations, these efforts also forced the regime to use hard 
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currency to obtain these luxury items (Cha 2013: 265-66; Cronin 2014: 244-45; Lankov 2014: 
154).  
 Although the Bush Administration focused heavily on the human rights violations taking 
place in North Korea and its links to terrorism, it also took part in the Six-Party talks, which also 
included China, South Korea, and Japan in addition to the US and North Korea, as part of an 
ongoing effort to limit the North Korean shift towards nuclear weapons development. These talks 
that began in 2003 and continued until 2011 were largely unsuccessful in achieving their purpose 
since North Korea tested missiles during this period in 2006 and in 2009 despite receiving 
increased aid from China and the resumption of US foreign aid (Cha 2013: 272-76; Lankov 
2014: 154-56). 
 Of the external shifts that began in the early 1990s that significantly damaged North 
Korea and its economy, none was as catastrophic as the loss of Soviet aid. In 1990, Soviet 
leadership decided to cut off aid to North Korea as it established economic ties and diplomatic 
recognition to South Korea, which included a three billion dollar loan from the ROK to the 
USSR. Seeing North Korea as a liability to the new partnership, the USSR ended subsidized 
trade with North Korea that fueled the latter’s economy and military cooperation that the DPRK 
used to export Soviet-made weaponry. In 1993, DPRK trade with Russia dropped six-fold from 
the amount in 1985, which stood at 49.5% of the North Korean economy. In particular, the loss 
of Soviet fuel aid crippled North Korean manufacturing output. Although China made moves to 
replace the Soviet Union as North’s principal patron, it still sputtered during this early period 
from $230 million in 1991 to $100 million in 1994 (Cha 2013: 122-24; Seth 2011: 420). 
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 By the mid-1990s, South Korea had successfully transitioned into a democracy through 
the presidency of Roh Tae-woo as the result of the 1987 elections. Roh, despite being a highly 
influential part of the dictatorial Chun Doo-Hwan’s administration, intentionally relaxed or 
reformed laws that restricted freedoms or political independence among branches of government. 
During the early years of his administration, the South Korean economy boomed with annual 
growth rates over 10%, that later slowed in 1990 into a recession because of a real estate crash. 
Since the timing of the South Korean bubble also coincided with a period of opening in the 
Soviet bloc, Roh leveraged the power of the ROK’s economy into developing economic ties with 
Eastern European states, especially the Soviet Union as mentioned above. These moves were 
intended to isolate North Korea from its Cold War allies and it accomplished this goal handily as 
Eastern bloc countries moved away from North Korea in favor of economic ties to their southern 
neighbor. By 1990, South Korean electoral patterns shifted leftward, resulting in a legislative 
majority of Roh’s major opposition party, the Democratic Liberal Party, headed by Kim Young 
Sam. Although Kim’s party lost legislative positions to the similarly leftist party of Kim Dae 
Jung, the critic of President Park Chung Hee and President Chun Doo-hwan, Kim Young Sam, 
managed to win the presidency (Seth 2011: 420-23). 
 Kim Young Sam increased the speed of Korea’s transition, began by Roh Tae Woo, in 
part by removing high-ranking military officials with connections to the Presidents Park and 
Chun, while also curbing the domestic scope of the Korea’s national security apparatus. 
However, he was unable to maintain his momentum.  His plans to reduce the influence of 
government-supported conglomerates, or chaebol, were unsuccessful and his unwillingness to 
repeal the Cold War-era National Security Law further diminished his popularity as a reformer. 
This in turn caused him to successfully prosecute Roh Tae Woo and Chun Do-hwan for offenses 
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committed prior to the democratic transition to restore his sagging popularity.  The political 
climate did not deter the South’s economic fortunes with a GNP growth of 7% in 1996 and 
official South Korean entry into the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). However, the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, which was exacerbated by uncontrolled 
corporate debt, led to a pullout of investments in East and Southeast Asia. This led to a collapse 
of the won, forcing South Korea to lobby the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $57 
billion dollar bailout package. Despite their success, the package was largest of any created at 
that point in history (Seth 2011: 467-68). 
 Amidst this backdrop, Kim Dae Jung, another opponent of Park and Chun, won election 
in a narrow vote. Kim Dae Jung managed to use the crisis to enact a number of reforms, 
including a restructured opening of the South Korean economy that reduced the influence of 
chaebols, allowed for foreign investment in the Korean stock market, and permitted foreign 
firms to own Korean ones. He also negotiated labor settlements that permitted companies to lay 
off workers. The effect of these neoliberal reforms were bitterly felt: unemployment increased 
from 2 to 8 percent in a country that predominantly featured a single breadwinner per household. 
However, these reforms allowed for a weakening of the won, which increased exports enough to 
allow South Korea to pay off the IMF loans more quickly than had been anticipated. Although 
South Korea suffered a brief downturn after the IMF removed some of its emergency funding, 
South Korea achieved several important economic milestones by 2006, including the $20,000 per 
capita income mark, which solidified its membership into the OECD. By 2008, South Korea 
became one of the largest holders of US debt (Seth 2011: 469-71). 
 In the arena of foreign policy, Kim Dae Jung’s signature accomplishment was the 
Sunshine Policy, which led to a historic summit between him and Kim Jong-il in 2000, for which 
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he was rewarded with a Nobel Prize. The key philosophy behind the policy, which offered aid to 
the North, was that instead of maintaining suspicious, acrimonious relations with the DPRK, it 
would better to engage with its historical enemy in a more open manner. This broke with long-
standing ROK policy towards the DPRK. This strained U.S.-ROK relationship in 2001, with the 
Bush II Administration viewing the Sunshine Policy as incentivizing problematic behavior on 
North Korea’s part. President Roh Moo-hyun, the successor of Kim Dae Jung, continued Kim’s 
policy and rejected arguments from conservative voices that advocated conditional aid to North 
Korea based on the North improving its human rights record and reducing its military buildup 
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Despite disagreements over North Korea, the South 
Korean government at that time remained supportive of the War on Terror and US foreign 
policy, although a definite generational gap was observed in public opinion polling (Seth 2011: 
475-81). 
 The fallout from North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test marked a shift in South Korean policy 
and picked up steam after the 2007 election of the conservative Lee Myung-bak to the 
presidency. He immediately announced an end to the Sunshine Policy and made South Korean 
aid contingent on North Korean movement on halting its nuclear program or increased human 
rights for North Korean citizens. This heavy-handed approach drew the ire of the North Korean 
elite, culminating in a series of nuclear and missile tests in 2009 and the sinking of the ROK 
naval vessel, Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. (BBC 2010a; BBC 
2010b; Cha 2010: 272-73, 296).   
 Interestingly enough, this period of the worsening in North Korean fortunes did not 
correlate to an increase in military provocations, but rather marked a shift towards nuclear 
weapons development and threat of acquiring missiles to extract aid.  Effectively, North Korea’s 
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stance largely shifted from an offensive posture, that of military action in and outside of the 
peninsula, to a defensive minded posture that is based upon a nuclear deterrent. The provocations 
that did occur prior to the Six Party Talks in 2003 were more benign in nature and primarily took 
the form of naval border crossings over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) which the DPRK does 
not recognize (Cha 2013: 272-76; Fischer 2007). 
This shift away from provocations towards nuclear development may be the result of two 
different factors. The South Korean government, especially during the late 1990s, became more 
willing to offer aid to North Korea, especially in the form of government-subsidized investment 
in industrial and tourist projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Kumgang 
Resort. These efforts generated cash for the North Korean government which it needed to offset 
the freezing of its overseas assets in order to obtain the goods that it used to maintain the support 
of its elites. As it had done during Sino-Soviet Split, North Korea was able to leverage policy 
differences between the US and ROK in the early and mid-2000s over how to engage it. Thus, 
the expanded use of military provocations would have largely been counterproductive by giving 
both countries a reason to unify against North Korean aid as they did after the election of Lee 
Myung-bak and the 2006 missile test.  
Second, the foray into nuclear weapons development has resulted in large concessions 
from the United States, something that military provocations were never able to do. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, North Korea received increased aid, including the promise of light-water reactor 
technology and historically large food aid, from the United States as part of its negotiations to 
suspend its nuclear programs. Furthermore, the Chinese have been willing to maintain and, after 
2006, increase their aid commitment to North Korea even in the face of international pressure not 
to do so. Effectively, not using the military for provocations in favor of nuclear weapons has 
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yielded greater benefits and attention from larger powers that correlates to increased aid. Since 
North Korea is still depends upon aid for its survival, switching tactics to extract the maximum 
amount of aid makes strategic sense (Cha 2013: 292-93; Lankov 2014: 155-57). 
Domestic 
 For North Korea, the 1990s is best remembered as a period of hastening decline. The fall 
of the Soviet Union severely damaged North Korea’s already weakened economy as its largest 
patron shut off aid. As a sign of the times, Kim Il-Sung publicly admitted in 1994 that such 
problems existed to the North Korean public – an act that would have never occurred during his 
heyday.  This precipitous decline marked a shift toward the development of nuclear weapons and 
the expansion of ballistic missile technology, one of the few sectors in which North Korea had a 
competitive, exportable product. Accelerating nuclear weapons research at Yongbyon drew 
increased pressure on the North to end its program, much of which came from the United States. 
The resulting crisis came to a head in 1994, which led to a negotiated settlement between North 
Korea and the United States which gave the DPRK “energy assistance, political normalization, 
and economic benefits” in exchange for halting and dismantling its nuclear program (Cha 2010: 
253; Seth 2011: 439-40). In addition to the opening up its nuclear facilities for International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspection, the North also received aid in the form of light-
water reactor technology needed for domestic nuclear energy production (Cha 2010: 253). 
 However, shortly after the US and North Korea reached a settlement, Kim Il-Sung died, 
which shocked the North Korea public. Although the transition between Kim Il-Sung and his 
son, Kim Jong-il, was smooth and Kim Jong-il had largely shared power prior to 1994, Kim 
Jong-il did not officially become the leader of North Korea until 1997 in order to follow a 
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Korean cultural mourning practice. In 1998, North Korea amended its constitution in a way that 
favored the military, including the decision to make the head of the National Defense Council 
also serve as the head of state. This shift was accompanied by “Military First” rhetoric, initiated 
by Kim Jong-il (McEachern 2010: 87; Seth 2011: 440-42). 
 In the same mourning period after Kim Il-Sung’s death, North Korea was hit with a 
period of intense famine because of both extreme weather patterns and poor agricultural policies 
that went back to the Kim Il-Sung era. In particular, intense flooding wrecked North Korean 
crops and North Korean officials fought United Nations’ certification requirements for food aid. 
Although some aid made it through the diplomatic impasse, up to a million North Koreans died 
from either starvation or infection brought about as the result of malnutrition. The party 
establishment largely felt that the introduction of market reforms or outside exposure would 
hasten the decline of the party, citing the dissolution of the Soviet bloc as an example of the 
dangers of cross-border trade and a market system (McEachern 2010: 72). 
Basic necessity on behalf of non-party citizens trumped party ideology: the famine led to 
the creation of an entrepreneurial class of citizens who sold their wares, either procured from 
nearby China or manufactured on their own. Farmers sold a portion of their crops in open-air 
markets. This burgeoning class of risk-taking merchants ultimately were able to achieve wealth 
that had previously been available only to the Party-faithful. Quite simply, the advent of the 
growing black market weakened the state’s control on social advancement at the time and eroded 
the public’s trust in government. In years past, faith in the revolution provided a means for 
advancement and salvation in society. The famine broke this norm by allowing those who defied 
the regime the chance to advance within society. The state, out of practical necessity, permitted 
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the introduction of open markets to combat the lack of state’s ability to provide basic necessities 
(McEachern 2010: 73-75). 
Concurrently with the famine, North Korea amended its constitution in 1998 that 
permitted an increased prominence of the military and separation between the Korean Peoples’ 
Army (KPA) and the Korean Workers’ Party by eliminating the requirement for military officers 
to report to party elites. The military-first politics, which emphasize the importance of the 
military over civil concerns, continue to this day. Under this new system, the KPA enjoyed 
greater influence in state decision making, even in matters outside of the military context (Cha 
2013: 91; McEachern 2010: 77-79). 
By late 2008, Kim Jong-il’s significant health issues forced the North Korean elites to 
unofficially prepare for his successor, who would naturally be part of the Kim family and one of 
Kim Jong-il’s three sons. This problem was that the first son, who is believed to have been 
prepared for this very role, fell out of favor several years prior for a failed attempt at entering 
Japan for tourism in 2001. This forced the regime to quickly speed up the ascension of Kim 
Jong-un, the youngest son, by giving him key positions in military leadership roles, despite a 
lack of any known military experience prior to 2010. Following his father’s death in 2011, his 
process of ascension ramped up through photo ops and other propaganda efforts, well after he 
had become the ruler of North Korea. In addition to the rushed propaganda efforts, the father also 
prepared for the eventual succession by setting up two regents, consisting of his sister and her 
four-star general husband, to help his son learn how to manage state affairs in 2009. In 2011, 
Kim Jong-il died and his son took power in his place, despite not having the prominence or 
prestigious positions that would make him the official heir apparent. This transitional period was 
where the power of Kim Jong-un was less than assured and thus the shelling of Yeonpyeong 
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Island and the sinking of the Cheonnan were likely part of a process designed to establish the 
credentials of the new leader towards the old guard (BBC 2010a; BBC 2010b; Cha 2013: 97-99; 
Lankov 2013: 132-36). Lankov (2013) postulates that this is more an accident of history than one 
of North Korean intent: Kim Jong-il believed that he had a three to seven year timeline to 
entrench his son an official role (136-37).  
North Korean military provocations during the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un era have 
taken place in periods of transitional leadership and less during times of national crisis or 
economic development. This suggests that, from a domestic standpoint, the provocations are 
highly correlated to changes in leadership, especially in 2010, and may be a method for North 
Korean policymakers to increase the profile of the new leader.  
However, the severity of these provocations also appears linked to the amount of aid 
received: Kim Jong-il’s provocations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which occurs during the 
heyday of the Sunshine Policy, are far less severe than the ones undertaken in 2010 when South 
Korean development aid began to decline under conservative leadership. The development 
projects that were undertaken during this period provided a means for North Korea to rebuild 
from the crippling famine of the 1990s and maintain the support of its elites through the 
acquisition of hard currency. Severe military provocations could have disrupted the creation of 
this capital, which is primarily located within North Korea, at a time when it was sorely needed 
to prop up the regime in the aftermath of its worst internal crisis. During the crisis itself, North 
Korea moved away from provocations in order to focus its domestic conditions. Effectively, the 
worst provocations appear to occur when North Korea has little to lose from doing so, e.g. when 
aid flows are low, and are lessened during times of emergency management and recovery. 
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Individual 
 Although it is difficult to fully understand the mindset of Kim Jong-il and his son, Kim 
Jong-un, due to the closed nature of North Korea, it is important to note that there are several 
factors that may affect their decision-making processes in comparison to Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-
il took over North Korea during one of its worst crises and his own legitimacy derived from the 
actions of his father. He lacked the military bonafides that his father possessed and faced several 
coup attempts from when he was officially designated the successor of Kim Il-Sung in the 70s to 
two years before he took office. His decision to observe the traditional Korean mourning period 
may go beyond cultural considerations: he needed to cement his image with the public and with 
other elites. Likewise, the early crises of his tenure forced him to take a pragmatic path early 
while balancing the need to shore up a power base. His decision to focus on policies that moved 
away from socialist policies, but also increased the stature and power of the military, are sensible 
in this regard: they allowed him to tackle a national catastrophe while building support from the 
military. Lacking the charisma of his father, Kim Jong-il was forced to rely more on pragmatism 
to maintain power and control over the state. This put a constraining force on his ability to 
initiate policies since his authority was not absolute. As a result, his willingness to engage 
provocations needed to factor in the desires of his base, which likely played a role in both 
conflictual and cooperative behavior. The provocations in 1997 around the Northern Limit Line 
may have been undertaken to demonstrate his commitment to military strength in a manner that 
did not threaten the survival of the regime  (Cha 2013: 95-96; Fischer 2007; McEachern 2010: 
70-75). 
Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un did not come into power when facing a national crisis. 
Instead, his larger concerns are believed to be his lack of credentials and tenuous stature within 
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elite circles. In particular, the 2010 provocations against Yeonpyeong Island and the Cheonan 
may be an attempt to further build his credentials since he visited the artillery sites that 
conducted the shelling. Further propaganda connects him to the 2009 missile tests, despite his 
lack of an official military position at the time (Cha 2013: 100-106). Cha (2013) notes that the 
newest Kim may also be facing elites who lack the perspective gained from living overseas: Kim 
Jong-il’s generation of high level officials were able to travel to the Soviet bloc, whereas Kim 
Jong-un’s generation saw the fall of that bloc as well as other friendly dictatorships in the Middle 
East (106). This lends credence to the view that he is presiding over a group of isolated elites 
who moderate or curb his ability to initiate reforms that would open the DPRK. 
Effectively, Kim Jong-il and his son were forced to negotiate a domestic political scene 
that required them to curry favor with a bloc in order to maintain control of the country. It 
appears that both elected to place their trust in the DPRK military, evidenced by the 
independence granted to the military in the 1990s constitutional revision and the use of military 
force against civilian targets in the period immediately after Kim Jong-un’s succession. Unlike 
their father, both leaders also face a difficult domestic situation that required them to focus on 
solving practical problems while balancing ideological constraints from other elites. 
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Analysis 
Provocation Trends 
 Following the Korean War, North Korean military provocations slowly increased from 
1958 to reaching a peak in 1967-70 with multiple high profile incidents that included the first 
attempt on Park Chung-hee’s life, the seizure of the USS Pueblo, and 130 man commando 
operation on South Korea’s eastern coast. The two years of 1967-68 also demonstrated a peak in 
infiltration operations: a total of 739 individuals were sent to South Korea in these two years or 
20% of the 3,693 total number of infiltrators from 1954-1992. The following years, 1969-70, 
followed a similar pattern of high profile incidents including the hijacking of a South Korean 
airliner, an attack on US soldiers at the DMZ, the provision of asylum for the Japanese Red 
Army terrorist group, and the creation of an underground revolutionary party (Nanto 2003).   
 After a brief lull, the number of provocative acts reached a similar uptick from 1974-
1979, which included the second attempt on Park Chung-hee’s life, the Panmunjom Axe Incident 
in which North Korean soldiers attacked US and ROK soldiers removing a tree, along with 
several abductions and attempted abductions of South Korean citizens from locations overseas. 
Similar with the incidents of the previous period, there were several infiltration attempts 
although none were as large at the aforementioned operation, but were instead comprised of 
smaller squads who engaged in armed conflict with ROK authorities (Fischer 2007; Nanto 2003).  
 Infiltration operations continued well into the early 1980s although assassination attempts 
were largely unused until 1982-83, when North Korea attempted to assassinate Chun Doo-hwan 
three times during his official visits overseas in Canada and Myanmar. Of the three, only the 
Burmese caper came close to being successful and, despite failing to accomplish its primary 
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objective, killed 17 senior personnel and the ROK ambassador to Myanmar. The 1982 attempt in 
the Philippines was revealed two years later in a Canadian court case in which the plaintiffs, both 
Canadian, revealed that they were contracted by the DPRK to kill Chun Doo-hwan during his 
visit there. Despite the continued use of small infiltrations by the North, this early period 
established a theme of shifts to operations abroad in the 1980s (Fischer 2007). 
 Provocative actions resumed from 1986-88, although the tactics employed by the DPRK 
were largely reminiscent of those used from the 1974-79 and the 1982-83 periods, although there 
was a greater focus on South Korean civilian targets either for acts of terrorism and kidnapping 
abroad. The two high profile bombing attempts, one in 1986 and 1987, specifically targeted 
South Korean commercial air activities, specifically Gimpo Airport and a Boeing 707 operated 
by Korean Airlines. According to the testimony of a defector who nominally ran a DPRK-
affiliated trading company in 1988, there was a worldwide directive to North Korean embassies 
to prevent the Seoul Olympics from occurring, suggesting that these attacks were part of a larger 
campaign to damage South Korean credibility overseas rather than to actually topple the state 
(Fischer 2007; Nanto 2003). 
  From 1989 to 1995, the provocations that occurred were limited mostly small-scale 
infiltrations, spying incidents, and attempted kidnappings and did not share the same scope the 
operations conducted in previous years. This trend changed in 1996-97 when North Korea 
carried out three crossings of the DMZ’s military boundaries with well over one hundred 
personnel taking part. In addition to terrestrial border crossings, there were several naval vessel 
crossings on both the Republic of Korea’s coasts, one of which was part of an infiltration 
attempt. In both years, the DPRK continued its policy of assassinations, one of a ROK diplomat 
in Russia and another of the nephew of Kim Jong-il’s first wife. While the 1989-1995 period is 
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notable for its relative calm, this period does mark the beginning of North Korea’s foray into 
nuclear weapons development (Nanto 2003). 
While there were still border crossing incidents that included submersible vessels and 
attempted kidnappings in the following years from 1997 to 2000, increased emphasis was shifted 
towards focusing on missile development and fiery rhetoric. This pattern continued until 2001-
2002 when North Korea significantly increased the number of naval incursions into South 
Korean territory, predominantly along the NLL, which they had unilaterally redrawn several 
years earlier and had historically disputed. At the same time, the North attempted move firearms 
and was caught selling SCUD missiles to Yemen in two smuggling incidents. In the following 
years, from 2003 to present, North Korea largely moved away from military-based provocations 
and instead focused on the development of nuclear weapons (Fischer 2007: Nanto 2003). The 
most notable provocations that occurred in the post-2002 period took place in 2010 with the 
sinking the Cheonnan, an ROK naval vessel, and the shelling of the civilian settlement on 
Yeongpyeong Island (BBC 2010a; BBC 2010b). 
Hypothesis Analysis 
Systemic: 
Hypothesis 1: If neighbors that it finds threatening to its security surround a state, it is more 
likely to engage in military provocations in an attempt to secure itself. 
 Throughout its entire history, North Korea has directly bordered a single hostile state, 
South Korea, while sharing two borders with its largest benefactors, the USSR and China. 
Although there has been a significant US military presence in the ROK and in nearby Japan since 
the end of World War II, the Security Dilemma dynamic does not convincingly provide 
 56 
explanatory power to the oscillating periods of military provocations specifically for three key 
reasons.  
 First, the most intense periods in the history of provocations occurred in periods when 
North Korea possessed a distinct developmental and military advantage against South Korea as 
described at length in Chapter III. Rather than engage in destabilizing provocations in times of 
perceived weakness, Kim Il-Sung made his boldest moves during the apex of North Korean 
strength and periods of historically high aid from both of its primary benefactors, the USSR and 
China. The calculus for provocative behavior stand in sharp contrast to the perception of self-
weakness that exists in a security dilemma: North Korea embarked used these policies as a 
means to capitalize on its existing strengths by providing the spark for a popular revolution that 
would overwhelm the South, paving the way for a takeover by DPRK’s military. Thus the 
dynamic, especially during the days of Kim Il-Sung, is the exact opposite: North Korea felt 
extraordinarily confident in its own security and sought to take advantage of its opponent’s 
insecurity. Based on this paradigm alone, it safe to conclude that a security dilemma does not 
provide predictive power during the most intense periods of provocations (Fischer 2007; Nanto 
2003; Seth 2011: 352-53). 
Even in the 1980s, when the South clearly had surpassed the DPRK, the bombing 
campaigns and infiltrations were centered on the limited objective of preventing the 1988 
Olympics from occurring, which would prove to be a significant loss of North Korean prestige. 
The emphasis of these attacks was not to demonstrate North Korean strength and capabilities, but 
rather to make the South appear to be an unstable country in the eyes of international 
community, incapable of safely hosting an event with the global renown like the Olympics. The 
event itself did not imminently threaten the North’s territorial security, only its pride and desire 
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to portray itself as the true Korea to citizens on both sides of the DMZ (Fischer 2007; Lankov 
2014: 31-33; Meyers 2010: 74-80; Nanto 2003). 
 During the era of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, there is a marked decrease in the scope 
of provocative behavior as defined by the operational definition that is limited to military and 
terrorist acts despite this being considered the period of increasing North Korean internal 
weakness from natural disasters and famine. Most of the incidents were limited to border 
crossings, especially naval ones that were fairly short. Most of the tactics used in this period 
other than the naval border crossings, such as overseas kidnappings and assassinations, generally 
correspond with those used a decade earlier and are far more limited in their scope and intensity. 
Instead, there is an observed shift towards achieving a nuclear deterrent and using the threat 
posed by nuclear weapons as a means of improving North Korea’s bargaining position in Six 
Party Talks. While these acts rightfully cause alarm within US and ROK military commands, 
these actions are far more defensive in nature, e.g. do not threaten to topple the South Korean 
government, and have yet to spark a peninsular arms race. Moreover, the Cheonnan and 
Yeongpyeong Island correlate with a leadership transition period in North Korea to Kim Jong-un 
just as do the border crossings do with Kim Jong-il’s buildup to becoming the official head of 
state three years after his father’s passing (BBC 2010a; BBC 2010b; Cha 2013: 224-229, 253; 
Fischer 2007; McEachern 2010: 72; Seth 2011: 439-42). 
 For these three reasons, the security dilemma as a systemic level variable does not 
indicate explanatory power over North Korea’s military provocations in both past and present. 
Rather, North Korea demonstrates a contrary mechanism for provocations: it attacks in times 
when it is assured of its own strength and South Korea’s weakness. In times of weakness, it 
typically moves to a defensive position, e.g. nuclear development, for the purposes of deterring 
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an attack from outside and to increase its ability to demand concessions from the ROK and the 
US. In the moments in which it has attacked in times of perceived weakness, the objectives do 
not appear to be for the purposes of building up its own strength, but are far more limited in 
scope to removing its opponent’s prestige on the world stage.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is 
rejected in its applicability to North Korean actions. 
 However, this is not to say that a security dilemma could not be used to the DPRK’s 
behavior, especially with its pursuit into nuclear weapons development. If the development of 
missile technology was included as a form of military provocations, albeit in a defensive form. In 
such a circumstance, the pursuit of nuclear weapons would be correlated to the decline in North 
Korea’s conventional military power and fear that an economically stronger South Korea could 
exploit its superiority in that capacity. Thus, the pursuit of nuclear weapons becomes a defensive 
hedge despite the fact that is considered highly provocative action against the ROK. This in turn 
could create the tension and buildup cycle as the South Korean military responds to a nuclear-
armed DPRK. 
Hypothesis 2: if a state is a junior or client actor in a bipolar system, it is more likely to not 
engage in military provocations as a result of pressure from its superpower patron than when it 
is when it is an actor in a multipolar environment. 
 For similar reasons to Hypothesis 1, the presence of a bipolar system does not appear to 
explain the behavior of North Korea and it appears that the opposite dynamic is actually in place. 
Even though North Korea has actually switched primary patron states with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, it still performs less conflictual behaviors, again using the definition of military 
provocations, in times of multi-polarity, reducing the validity of the hypothesis. 
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 The peak of North Korean provocations occurs during the Cold War, a time of clear 
bipolarity between the USSR and the US, and shows a downward trend as the world shifts into 
the multi-polar environment of the present day. North Korea in its heyday as a prime recipient of 
Soviet aid made multiple attempts to subvert and otherwise destabilize the region against both 
US targets, namely the USS Pueblo, and South Korean targets, e.g. The Blue House. These 
actions, in comparison with those undertaken from the 1990s to present, are far more egregious 
and ambitious despite the fact that it was during that same period that North Korea reached the 
apex of its economic and developmental might. Thus, the results indicate the opposite type of 
paradigm as described in the hypothesis: North Korea engaged in highly escalatory military 
behavior when it received the highest amounts of aid from its patron and engaged in less 
provocative behavior in the multipolar environment where it receives aid that is a fraction of 
what it originally was (Cha 2013: 122-24; Seth 2011: 340-43). 
 While Hypothesis 2 can be rejected for the reasons listed above, it is also important to 
note that labelling North Korea as a client state of the USSR and China is not necessarily a valid 
definition. Indeed the DPRK’s economy is wholly dependent upon foreign aid and, of that 
foreign aid, the most reliant on the beneficence of China and, prior to its dissolution, the Soviet 
Union. Prior to the Korean War, the DPRK was quintessentially subservient to the USSR and, to 
a slightly lesser extent, Mao’s China to the point where it was occupied by Soviet troops and was 
forced to heavily lobby both Stalin and Mao’s for permission to conduct a military campaign 
against the American-occupied ROK to reunify the peninsula (Jager 2013: 61-63; Seth 2011: 
349-50). 
However, North Korea also used its geostrategic position as a buffer state to achieve a 
state of relative independence from both the USSR and China by playing its patron’s interests 
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against one another in order to maximize both its level of independence from both powers and 
foreign aid in all forms. Effectively, North Korea pursued and continues to pursue a path that 
gave it the best of both worlds, the enormous gifts of superpower patronage without the 
interference and leverage that such assistance usually accompanies said patronage.  Its historical 
success in leading itself down provide reason to reject North Korea as a strictly client state in 
general and rather as a quasi-independent recipient of foreign aid. Its growing independence 
from other countries, particularly during the time of Kim Il-Sung, is functionally better in 
explaining North Korea’s actions than the Cold War client-patron state dynamic (Ahn 1987: 30-
33; Cha 2013: 144-53; Lankov 2013: 11-21). 
 This seemingly paradoxical position of North Korean political independence and foreign 
aid dependence is noted in the literature (Cha 2013: 144-53; Lankov 2013: 11-21; Meyers 2010: 
33). Meyers (2010) provides an alternative explanation based on a historical analysis of North 
Korean propaganda that provides a small window into which North Korea is willing to receive 
aid, yet is equally able to pursue an independent agenda from that of its patrons. He defines 
North Korea as being more in line with the traits of an ethno-nationalist state, as opposed to a 
particularly Communist one that defines itself as inherently being racially pure, yet vulnerable to 
the whims of the outside world (31-37). As a result, it is able to acknowledge the strength of 
outside powers, yet considers itself as an inherently exceptional entity in terms of its moral 
values than that of its benefactors. Essentially, it is willing to receive aid that is necessary for its 
own survival, even if that aid comes from a stronger yet morally repugnant state, because the act 
of doing so does not harm its own purity. Furthermore, its innate purity of it being and intent 
provides a justification for its own actions: they become right due to the goodness of the Korean 
people who perform them with only the best intentions of reunifying the peninsula. The DPRK is 
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willing to acknowledge its position vis-à-vis other nations, but also able to justify its provocative 
actions because those actions are aimed at protecting the Korean people as a whole from the 
outside world (57, 74-85).  
 Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected for two key reasons. First, North Korea’s behavior does 
not fit the expected behavior of a client-state in that the North engaged in more escalatory 
behavior when it received the most amount of aid and performed fewer provocations during 
periods when it was a recipient of substantially less aid. Furthermore, North Korea may not be a 
truly client state because of its willingness to pursue independence and foreign aid 
simultaneously. An alternate definition that the DPRK is not as much a client as it is an ethno-
nationalist may work better in explaining its historical behavior with its military provocations 
(Cha 2013: 122-24; Meyers 2010: 37; Seth 2011: 420).   
Domestic: 
Hypothesis 3: we expect a state to engage in military provocations towards other states that do 
not share a common cultural or civilization heritage with it and cooperative behavior towards 
countries in which those links were historically strong. 
Hypothesis 4: we expect a state to not engage in military provocations towards another state 
with whom it shares economic ties. 
 The evidence for the related Hypotheses 3 and 4 is decidedly mixed, although there may 
be room to evaluate this hypothesis as true depending on what type of civilizational type is used, 
particularly one with less of the long-term historical emphasis employed by Huntington in favor 
of one with greater a political emphasis. Since North Korea engages in both conflictual and 
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cooperative behavior towards states in which it shares civilizational ties, allowing for alternative 
definitions may give more explanatory power for this hypothesis. 
 First, it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of North Korean military 
provocations described in the works of Nanto (2003), Fischer (2007), and the BBC (2010a; 
2010b) are directed towards South Korea, the state in which it shares the greatest amount of 
historical and civilizational ties. No other country in the world comes close to having the same 
linguistic, cultural, and geographic influences that North Korea and South Korea share, 
especially due to the fact that both were historically a single entity until the end of World War II. 
In spite of this, the trends and behaviors identified from the sources that document military 
provocations from North Korea towards the South are clearly in opposition to a Huntingtonian 
assumption that shared civilization results in greater cooperative behavior.  In fact, it provides 
evidence in support of the opposite position, that North Korea engages in conflictual behavior 
with the states that it shares the greatest civilizational ties with (Huntington 1993; Jager 2013: 
13-14; Seth 2011: 305-313). 
 When using Huntington’s macroscopic definition of civilization that places North Korea 
under the Confucian cleavage, the results are far less conclusive than if one limits the scope to 
Korean civilization. The DPRK does not engage in military provocations against China despite 
vicissitudes in friendly and antagonistic relations in both countries’ diplomatic history. It largely 
views other nations in the Confucian sphere, particularly Southeast Asian nations who were part 
of the Communist bloc, as a key part of its strategy for establishing legitimacy against South 
Korea and has established relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations members 
outside of the aforementioned bloc. Seemingly, North Korea tends to enjoy peaceful 
relationships with the majority of Confucian civilization and especially close relationship in 
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recent years with that civilization’s center, China (Chung 1987: 197-99; Huntington 1993; Kim 
1987: 363-65; Kim 2011: 150-53).  
 While South Korea is the prime exception to this hypothesis, Japan is also another 
example of where North Korea engages in conflictual behavior, albeit to a lesser scale, with a 
non-Confucian state according to Huntington’s (1993) definition. Like South Korea, Japan and 
North Korea do not recognize each other formally although there was a period of warming 
relations from the 1970s the late 1980s with the intent of expanding economic ties. However, the 
admission that North Korea had engaged in abductions of Japanese citizens in 2002 in a meeting 
between Kim Jong-il and Junichiro Koizumi led to a diplomatic cooling as tensions over the 
abductee issue from the Japanese public forced Japan to back out of agreements with North 
Korea and made the issue a key wedge in negotiations designed to reestablish ties. In addition to 
the abduction issue, North Korea engaged in territorial incursions to Japan using its navy, which 
fit the definition of military provocations. Since North Korea also has conflictual relations with 
another Confucian state, South Korea, it does not necessarily hold that sharing a civilizational 
history specifically that of the Confucian civilization is necessarily true, although there is 
evidence for it given Sino-North Korean and Japanese-North Korean relations (Cha 2013: 380-
85; Kim 2011: 166-70; Nanto 2003; Shin 1987: 284-87).  
 Given the information, it may be useful to define civilization in a slightly more political 
context, and then the foreign policy trends that have been identified in North Korea begin to fit 
better than using the Huntington definition. If there were a defined Communist civilization that 
included the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, China, and other nations using a variant of the Communist 
model, then the civilizational model would hold true. The strongest and most long-lasting 
relations that North Korea has had, with largely an absence of provocations, are countries within 
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the Communist world, especially its two largest entities, China and the Soviet Union. From its 
beginning, it has had stable relationship with the Eastern European bloc and later expanded its 
diplomatic operations to Africa and Southeast Asia as it attempted to show its legitimacy on the 
world stage over South Korea, which it ultimately lost after the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. It 
is worth noting that the DPRK’s movement outside of the Soviet sphere coincides with a larger 
period of Soviet engagement in the outside world, indicating that it followed the path of its 
patron state in its development of foreign ties outside of the Korean peninsula, albeit with a more 
localized goal related to the inter-Korean rivalry.  Thus, it is safe to assume, regardless of 
whether one considers North Korea to be a Communist state, that it would be a member of a 
Communist civilization that largely lasted until the Soviet collapse 1990s and it enjoyed 
generally good relations with other Communist states with different models despite the lack of 
historical links with many of those countries (Fischer 2007; Lankov 2013: 31; Kim 1987: 363-
65; Kim 2011: 103; Nanto 2003; Seth 2011: 349-50).  
  The benefit of using this conception of a civilization is that North Korean behavior 
historically would largely fit the hypothesis with this alternative definition. South Korea, Japan, 
and the US would of a Capitalist civilization and thus more conflictual behavior towards these 
states is expected as a result of their political differences in civilization. This mirrors the actual 
data rather well: the worst North Korean provocations occurred prior to periods of 
rapprochement between Communist and Capitalist spheres and largely declined in intensity over 
time using this thesis’ operational definition of conflictual behavior. Effectively, the alternative 
definition of civilization would show support for the hypothesis more cleanly than Huntington’s 
one since two of the states in which North Korea has engaged in such behavior with are outside 
of the civilizational confines (Fischer 2007; Nanto 2003; Seth 2011: 347-49; Shin 1987: 284-87) 
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 However, Huntington’s position was designed to provide a model for conflict in the post-
Cold War period that would demonstrate the fault lines of conflict outside of what he felt were 
ideological in nature, not civilizational. Thus, there is a strong argument that would put the 
alternative definition into question by stating that it is placing a civilizational label on an 
ideological conflict. In fact, regardless of whether or not the Communist versus Capitalist sphere 
is defined as ideological or civilizational in nature, the results of North Korean would be largely 
same since the contours of each side would not change in either circumstance (Huntington 1993; 
Fischer 2007).  
 Hypothesis 4, which is designed to counter Huntington essentially eliminates this 
definitional problem, but also runs into the issue of negotiating the South Korea question (Ajami 
1993; Deutsch et al. 1957; Russett and Oneal 2001: 130). The data supports this hypothesis in the 
Kim Il-Sung era, but is clearly mixed during the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un eras where there 
is greater connectedness between the two Koreas from changes in North Korea’s economic and 
leadership conditions described in the historical overview chapters. Dependency theory, in which 
a smaller economy resists a larger economy through the use military disputes due to perceived 
unfair treatment in trade, may explain North Korea’s actions in the post-Kim Il-Sung era. Despite 
the opening of trade relations between North Korea and South Korea, military provocations 
against the South have continued as the South’s economy and level of development continues to 
increase, while North Korea moves in the opposite direction in both fronts. (dos Santos 1970; 
Mearsheimer 1992; Rubinson 1976; Russett and ONeal 2001: 132).  
 The height of North Korean military provocations in the late 1960s and 1970s occur well 
before the 1997 softening of inter-Korean relations under the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae Jung, 
which essentially brought economic assistance to the North from the South. Prior to this period, 
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the two Koreas regarded each other with hostility, especially towards the end of the Cold War 
when the South began to overtake the North in terms of its economic development. At the same 
time, North Korea never used provocative actions against the USSR or China despite ideological 
differences and conflicts over policy and shared close economic relations with the two 
Communist powers through foreign aid. This suggests that Hypothesis 6 is largely true during 
the Kim Il-Sung era since it effectively employed a cooperative strategy with the two states who 
it had the closest and most significant economic ties while engaging in the absolute worst of its 
conflictual behavior against the state in which it had no such ties and a significantly worse 
relationship (Fischer 2007; Lankov 2013: 11-21; Seth 2011: 475-81). 
Moreover, in the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un era, in which the Sunshine Policy became 
a significant cornerstone between the DPRK and the ROK, military provocations still occurred, 
albeit to a lesser extent and severity as to those undertaken in the days of Kim Il-Sung. The worst 
of these provocations, the sinking of the Cheonnan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, took 
place well after the cessation of the Sunshine policy and an increasingly monumental impasse 
over nuclear weapons development in North Korea. When looked considered in isolation, this 
does lend support for Ajami’s idea that economic fault lines would play a larger role in 
determining conflict rather than a civilizational explanation. Indeed, the periods of the lowest 
amount of conflict do take place when South Korea made serious investments into North Korea 
and conflictual behavior resumed after those investments were decreased under a more 
conservative leadership party in the Blue House (Ajami 1993; Cha 2013: 272-73, 296; Seth 
2011: 475-81).  
 However, the economic ties hypothesis loses its explanatory power when looked at from 
a long-term context of North Korea’s use of military provocations. As mentioned in the previous 
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section, the use of provocations actually declined after the 1970s as operations became more 
localized and focused on limited objectives rather than a grand strategy to start a popular 
revolution against the South Korean government and the most egregious incidents of 2010 are 
outliers in this overall trend. Thus, the onset of economic ties between North Korea and South 
Korea as an explanatory factor may in fact be spurious in nature in that it occurs during a general 
period of decline in the use of provocative behavior as a form of policy. Furthermore, the 
absence of this behavior does not necessarily indicate that North Korea stopped acting hostile 
towards South Korea or refused to engage in antagonistic behaviors towards its neighbor. 
Instead, this period also marks the rise in a shift away from provocations in favor of the threat of 
nuclear weapons development, which is still highly threatening to South Korea without meeting 
the definition of provocative actions.  Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that North Korea 
did not really change with the advent of economic ties, but rather behaved in such a way that is 
consistent with historical trends and policy shifts of that time (Cha 2013: 272-73; Lankov 2013: 
145-50; Fischer 2007; Nanto 2003). 
 In conclusion, there is evidence that Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 do hold a modicum 
of explanatory power in that they hold true for certain periods of time, although Hypothesis 5 
may require an alternative definition of civilization to hold true, which runs the risk of redefining 
the conflict into ideological terms. Hypothesis 6 appears true in the short-term analysis of each of 
the regimes, but comes into question when considering the long-term trends, which move in a 
downward, and the policy shifts that occurred during the same period. As a result, the efficacy of 
these hypotheses is called into question and are inconclusive.  
Hypothesis 7: if a state faces internal insecurity, then they are more likely to engage in military 
provocations. 
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 Like Hypothesis 4, this hypothesis is not necessarily supported by the data when 
examined from a short-term perspective, as there is only one known case of severe domestic 
insecurity in the form of food shortages within North Korea during the 1990s. As such, it is 
difficult to conclude if this variable is truly explanatory since it coincided with a period of 
transitional leadership between Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il. However, the inconclusiveness of 
this variable at the domestic level of analysis does not eliminate the possibility of it becoming an 
explanatory variable at the individual level of analysis in the following section.  
 North Korean society for much of its history has remained fairly stable and generally has 
not experienced serious internal threats to the ability of any given Kim regime to maintain its 
political control in the post-Korean War era. The only real instance in which it faced such a 
challenge comes in the famine of 1994 following the death of Kim Il-Sung, which lasted until 
1999. By conservative estimates, the deaths that resulted from the famine are roughly 2.5% of 
North Korea’s population at that time, which does not including other effects such as 
malnourishment, and the state’s food distribution apparatus was completely shut down, 
squeezing lower level bureaucrats and workers. While there was a significant string of 
provocations in 1997 with border crossings and weapons sales overseas, North Korea largely did 
not use provocations during this period. Instead, the state relaxed certain rules that allowed for 
the creation of black markets, informally tolerated noncompliance of state regulations, and 
bribery of officials became common. Instead of rallying around the flag, North Korean elites 
essentially looked the other way rather than increase forms of oppression and control. Even with 
the context of those provocations, they do not appear to be directed at shoring up political 
support but rather emphasizing their commitment to redrawing the Northern Limit Line and 
perhaps also the official transition of Kim Jong-il as a successor. As it stands, North Korea does 
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not appear to use provocations to divert public attention away from domestic problems, but 
rather engages in a strategy of tolerance that did not threaten the regime’s ability to maintain 
effective political control (Cha 2013: 124-29; Fischer 2007; Lankov 2014: 78-94; McEachern 
2010: 72-75).  
However, it is important to note that this variable only concerns itself with problems at 
the domestic level of analysis, meaning that the issue that North Korea is responding to is wide 
enough in scope to be noticeable for most of the country. The inconclusiveness of this variable at 
this level of analysis does not mean that it cannot drive decision-making at the individual level. 
Certainly, all three leaders of the Kim dynasty may make decisions to engage in provocative 
behavior when they perceive themselves, not the country as a whole, to be subject to insecurity 
with regard to their position. 
In conclusion, Hypothesis 7 is rejected because it does not comport with the data since 
there is only one instance of severe provocations in this period in 1997 that does not appear to be 
directly related to the famine. Instead, there is ample evidence to suggest that North Korea opted 
to loosen state controls in certain areas, especially ones conducive to trade, rather than increase 
patriotic fervor among its citizens. 
Individual: 
Hypothesis 5: if a country’s leader fits the mold of a constraint challenger, he or she will be 
more willing to use military provocations in their foreign policy decisions than a constraint 
respecter, regardless of regime type, in managing crises. 
 Within the three regimes, there is only one North Korean leader who fully embodies the 
characteristics of a constraint-challenger based on Keller’s (2005) traits of task emphasis, need 
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for power, distrust, and nationalism. His son, Kim Jong-il, while sharing certain similarities does 
not demonstrate the traits in such a way that clearly marks him as a constraint-challenger. Given 
the lack of data on Kim Jong-un in comparison to his father and grandfather, this hypothesis will 
not include the current leader of North Korea as an object of analysis. Hypothesis 5 is supported 
by the historical records of both leaders. 
 Kim Il-Sung clearly matches the profile of a constraint-challenger. Several policies 
undertaken within his regime clearly indicate a task-emphasis and a leader who was highly 
distrustful of those outside of his inner circle, regardless of their ability and willingness to 
threaten him. Particular evidence of this is derived from the extensive purges his regime carried 
out in its early years, before and after the Korean War. While certain elements of those purged 
were seen as having ties to undesirable elements to the North’s regime or had directly challenged 
Kim’s authority, the Dear Leader also extensively purged important figures within the Korean 
Communist circles who had been active in the peninsula well before Kim Il-Sung came into 
power. Certain victims, who held leadership positions in the Korean Worker’s Party, did not 
directly challenge Kim Il-Sung’s power and, in one instance, only filled a ceremonial role. In a 
telling statistic, only two members of the original Politburo, including Kim Il-Sung, of 1949 died 
of natural causes, and another two died at the hands of South Korean and American forces. The 
remaining six of the ten-member politburo were purged at the behest of Kim Il-Sung. Those 
replaced in the wake of the purges were partisans with whom he fought with and were more 
willing to carry out his orders without issue. While his regime remained suspicious and hostile of 
the ROK and the US, his regime showed distrust at reformist elements, manifested in a series of 
diplomatic barbs, within China and the Soviet Union, even when the North received the greatest 
amount of foreign aid from both countries. It was only towards the end of his life in 1994 in 
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which his regime moved to negotiate an agreement with the United States over nuclear weapons 
development. The nationalism of Kim Il-Sung is also well supported: Kim Il-Sung intentionally 
moved his regime away from being part of the Communist sphere in favor of ethno-nationalist 
Korean rhetoric that established himself as the ultimate embodiment of Korean-ness both in 
internal propaganda and propaganda intended for South Korean consumption. He demonstrates 
the characteristics of a constraint-challenger in their fullest as leader who intentionally stamped 
out any form of dissent, solidified his power into a form of total control, distrusted those who did 
match his background, and promoted nationalist rhetoric aimed at Korean peoples (Cha 2013: 
252-253; Lankov 2014: 12-18; Keller 2005; Meyers 2010: 31-37; Nanto 2003; Seth 2011: 344-
51, 475). 
 Unlike his father, Kim Jong-il, showed less in common with the characteristics that 
designate a leader as a constraint-challenger. Although he was shown in North Korean 
propaganda in much the same light as his father, a paragon and protector of the inherent purity of 
the Korean people. He has shown to be more willing to engage with other powers, including 
those who are considered to be a threat, and negotiate as evidenced by North Korean 
participation in the Six Party Talks and other high-level bilateral talks in the mid-2000s.  Despite 
raising the status of the military in the new constitution, he opted for a system that divided and 
ruled the two major factions within North Korean elite spheres, the military and the Korean 
Workers’ Party, which stands in stark opposition to the heavily centralized system that his father 
ruled over where the party became the superior organ of governance. His style of leadership, 
which emphasized the sharing of responsibility and governance, is not consistent with the need 
for power in the way his father’s was. In summary, while he does share certain characteristics of 
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his father, he does not fit the mold of a constraint challenger (Cha 2013: 255-89; Lankov 23-26; 
Kim 2006: 49, 91-99; Keller 2005; McEachern 2010: 72-75; Meyers 2010: 114-17).  
 The timeline of provocations shows that the greatest number of provocations in terms of 
severity and boldness occurred under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung and lessening of 
provocations under Kim Jong-il, who does not fit within that mold. The most brazen attempts at 
toppling the South Korean regime or destabilizing it occur under Kim Il-Sung’s reign, such as 
the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the attack on the Blue House. Even in the 1980s, where the 
focus shifted away from igniting a popular revolution into preventing South Korea from 
overtaking North Korea in international prestige, the most blatant assassination and bombing 
attempts occurred, despite an overall decrease in the number of provocations that occurred. 
Comparatively, under his son’s leadership, the number of military provocations decreased in 
severity and potential for harm to South Korean civilians, with the worst of provocations 
occurring early in his regime, and instead pursued missile development. Effectively, the 
constraint-challenger demonstrated a greater likelihood of engaging in military provocations than 
that of the non-constraint-challenger, thereby meeting the expected results of the hypothesis. As 
a result of the evidence provided, Hypothesis 5 has been demonstrated to be true within two 
profiles of North Korean leaders (Fischer 2007; Nanto 2003; Seth 2011: 352-53). 
Hypotheses 6: if a leader of a country perceives himself or herself to be within the domain of 
losses, then that leader will be more like to engage in risk-acceptant military provocations in 
order to maintain the status quo. 
 There is ample evidence to suggest that Hypothesis 6 holds true at the individual level 
across all three leaders in each of their regimes. It is important to note that the conditions that 
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precipitated the military provocations for Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un are similar, yet the two 
are highly different in their historical context than the instance in which Kim Il-Sung followed a 
prospect theory-based decision-making style. In all three instances of provocations used, the 
objectives of the action were limited in scope to influence specific events and the tactic was 
discontinued once the event reached its conclusion. 
 For Kim Il-Sung, the successful completion of the 1988 Seoul Olympics placed the 
claims that his regime regarding its economic development vis-à-vis the South, a key 
underpinning of the propaganda claims that it used to establish its legitimacy, and his battle for 
legitimacy in the eyes of Korean people within the peninsula. Until that period, North Korea had 
attained a level of development well above South Korea’s despite the devastation of its industry 
following the Korean War. The economic policies than began under Park Chung Hee, which 
were continued by his successors, began to shift the dynamic in favor of South Korea as the 
Miracle on the Han quickly propelled its economic growth. Both countries competed for global 
recognition outside of their traditional allies in order to make themselves appear to be more 
legitimate in the eyes of their domestic audiences, the audiences of the other country, and 
international ones. Seoul hosting the Olympics would be a deathblow to North Korea in terms of 
maintaining its historical prestige and the legacy of Kim Il-Sung. As a result, there was a serious 
of assassination attempts on President Chun Doo-Hwan overseas in addition to bombings of a 
Korean airliner and Gimpo Airport in Seoul. Each of these events were designed for the purpose 
of preventing South Korea from hosting the Olympics by creating a perception that South Korea 
was unsafe and unstable. After the conclusion of the Olympics, North Korea generally 
abandoned these tactics for the rest of Kim Il-Sung’s regime. Thus, the evidence suggests that 
Kim Il-Sung was willing to engage in provocative behavior when he perceived himself to be in 
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the domain of losses, e.g. losing prestige to South Korea on the world stage, and was willing to 
use military provocations in order to prevent further losses (Fischer 2007; Heo and Roehrig 
2010: 78-84; Lankov 2013: 31; Kim 1987: 363-65; Kim 2011: 103; McEachern 2010: 58; Nanto 
2003; Seth 2011: 349-67). 
 Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un both employed military provocations in the transitional 
period in the buildup and consolidation of official state power. In 1997, Kim Jong-il officially 
came into power after completing a traditional Korean mourning period of three years after his 
father’s death in 1994 and did not enjoy the same level of institutional control that his father had 
through the early elimination of political rivals with Soviet backing. Kim Jong-un came into 
power through a rushed succession process due to his father’s death forcing the need to hoist him 
into an authority position without the same amount of time and preparation that his father had 
prior to the grandfather’s death. Both came in during a time of relative weakness, Kim Jong-un 
lacked the credentials and training needed to establish dominance while his father was forced to 
establish a power base and manage a domestic crisis. In both instances of transition in 1997 and 
2010, the North Korean navy engaged in military provocations, one that amounted to a series of 
overt and covert border crossings and another that employed direct military force against ROK 
targets. Given the similarity in the tactics employed in each instance and the timing despite 
differences in their overall severity, it does suggest that both leaders are willing to employ 
military provocations in moments when they perceive themselves to be the weakest and 
vulnerable to challenges in leadership (Cha 2013: 95-96, 106; Lankov 2013: 10-15; McEachern 
2010: 70-75), 
 Given that this trend had been observed in the actions of all three leaders, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Hypothesis 6 holds at the individual level despite not being as conclusive at the 
 75 
domestic level. Although the circumstances shifted between Kim Il-Sung and his successors, 
there is a clear correlation between military provocations to meet short-term objectives in order 
to move out of the domain of losses. In each instance, the provocations stopped after the event, 
either a leadership transition or the Olympics, concluded, lending credence that these acts were 
carried out for a limited objective.  
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Conclusions 
Findings and Summary 
Table of Results 
Level of 
Analysis 
 
Systemic 
 
Domestic 
 
Individual 
Hypothesis 
Number 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H7 H5 H6 
Result Rejected Rejected Mixed Mixed Rejected Accepted Accepted 
 
As discussed in the Analysis chapter, it has been demonstrated that the systemic level 
hypotheses, which are based on theories developed with historical conditions in Europe prior to 
World War I and in the Cold War. Effectively, North Korea did not behave in the manner 
expected of a client state nor in the trends of a multipolar environment despite its heavy reliance 
on foreign aid for institutional stability. Instead of acting like junior partner who followed the 
preferences of its senior partners, North Korea behaved along the lines of a rational actor who 
attacked in times of perceived strength against South Korea in both the Korean War and in future 
provocations. It should be understood that strength in this case indicates a higher level of 
economic development than the ROK as well as a high level of autonomy from its patron states 
as a result of pitting those states against one another. Even though the DPRK is heavily reliant on 
others for its survival, in the instances of strength, it had a high degree of confidence in being 
able to receive future aid due to its geostrategic position. Alternatively, the attacks may be a 
function of the leadership style at the time that fit the mold of a constraint challenger.  
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At the domestic level, it is unclear whether or not civilizational or economic demonstrate 
explanatory power over the North Korean provocative military behavior. Prospect theory, 
defined at both the individual and domestic levels, resulted in different outcomes at each 
respective level of analysis: the domestic level hypothesis was rejected and the individual level 
variable was accepted. Like prospect theory, the constraint-challenger hypothesis at the 
individual level was also accepted based on historical evidence. 
At the systemic level, there are two possible explanations for why North Korea defied 
trends that well established and respected within International Relations theory. First, North 
Korea was leverage its position as a necessary hedge within the Sino-Soviet Split in such a way 
that it was able to continually receive Chinese and Soviet aid without being subject to heavy 
interference in its internal affairs. Alternatively, the elements of the early North Korean 
Communist movement that were more aligned towards the Soviet and Sino spheres instead of the 
personality cult of Kim Il-Sung were removed at such early stage in North Korean development 
that such interference simply could not occur. As a result of either explanation or a combination 
thereof, North Korea was able to achieve a level of independence that permitted it to pursue its 
own goals, which it laid out from the Korean War as the reunification of the peninsula. As a 
result, it may have been less restrained in its ability to pursue that objective, when compared to 
other states in Eastern Europe. 
Second, North Korea’s behavior may not be in line with that of a Communist bloc state 
due to the fact that over time, it did not necessarily pursue goals in line with expanding the 
revolution as a whole, but rather on concerns of the Korean peninsula and its peoples, who had 
been historically united under a single political entity. That is to say, that North Korea’s desire to 
reestablish this type of a unified ethnic state was at the forefront of its concerns: any commitment 
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to ideology or the revolution may have been more aimed at aid-giving foreign audiences rather 
than a reflection of its objectives. Therefore, North Korea’s focus may lie in limited goals to the 
peninsula and its policy actions better fit to these localized objectives rather than the expansion 
of the revolution outside of the peninsula. If this were the case, it is reasonable to expect that 
North Korea would not fit neatly into Cold War assumptions.  
For the domestic level, the mixed results lie at a definitional level since defining a 
Communist civilization would largely run into the issue of conflating ideological agreement 
among nations into a broader definition. The economic hypothesis is also strange in that North 
Korea has historically not engaged in military provocations against its benefactors prior to the 
end of the Cold War, it has engaged in such behaviors with the South, who has provided vital 
economic and humanitarian support to North Korea after the Soviet Union collapsed.   
The general trend is that North Korea engages in cooperative behavior with states whom 
it shares a relatively positive or neutral history and conflictual behavior with states that it has had 
an antagonistic relationship in the past, namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan. While 
it is natural for North Korea to not engage in military provocations against its historical 
benefactors, China and Russia, the fact that its provocative behavior does not extend to other 
countries in East and Southeast Asia, despite its willingness to use those countries for operations 
against South Korea, speaks to the efficacy of an explanation based on enduring rivalries. There 
are few disputes between North Korea and these nations, even if those nations were allied with 
the United States, as was the case for the Philippines and Canada. Those nations do not heavily 
contribute to the schism between the two Koreas, which North Korea has sought to rectify for 
much of its existence and therefore do not merit the attention and effort given their geographic 
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distance from the peninsula. Along the same lines, North Korea’s military may not have the 
capability to actually engage in such provocations given their state of economic decline.  
For the individual level of analysis, North Korean behavior can be explained in part by 
individual level factors such as a prospect theory and the constraint-challenger model. Despite 
the worst of the provocations occurring at time of strength, North Korea has used provocations at 
times when the leader feels a loss of prestige or insecurity within their own position given the 
provocations that occurred prior to the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and during transitional periods in 
1997 and 2010. Likewise, the earlier period of provocations is explained the constraint-
challenging nature of Kim Il-Sung, who engaged in provocative actions for much of his tenure 
while his son took a different approach. This lends credence to the idea that North Korea may be 
more leadership driven in nature, which would make sense given the purges that resulted in 
establishment of political leadership with stronger ties to the Kim family than ideological 
adherence to external political philosophies. 
 In conclusion, the most explanatory parts of North Korean provocations occur at the 
individual level of analysis rather than the domestic and systemic levels as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter. The rejection or inconclusiveness of the hypotheses in those levels of analysis 
may indicate that North Korea is heavily focused on goals that are limited to itself and South 
Korea rather than global or civilizational concerns. The results demonstrate that North Korea is a 
heavily leadership-driven state and its decision-making calculus likely is driven by 
considerations that are held by its elite.  
Areas for Improvement and Future Research 
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 There are several areas in which this thesis can be improved upon and there weaknesses 
to the approach taken. These are areas of improvement fill into two categories of definitional and 
data. As a result of these weaknesses, the conclusions made herein are called into question and 
should be further reexamined in the future with a greater rigor in its experimental design.  
 The definitional weakness of this thesis is that it does not include nuclearization as a form 
of provocations, and, as a result, makes no effort to explain the casual factors beyond this policy 
shift within the last twenty years with the declining use of provocations in favor of nuclear 
weapons development. For policymakers, North Korean nuclearization and the expansion of its 
missile technologies is naturally a key area of concern because of the threat that such weapons 
possess and its ability to shift the balance of power away from South Korea. The decision not to 
include these actions as part of its military provocations limits the definition to the conventional 
use of arms that North Korea is shifting away from. Furthermore, it is likely that South Korean 
and American authorities would consider actions relating to nuclear tests as being inherently 
provocative in nature, making the thesis’ operational definition of provocation more limiting 
than what it would be considered in a practical sense to outside observers. 
 However, the pursuit of nuclear weapons would likely be considered a defensive action 
from the perspective of North Korean planners who need to factor in the degradation of their 
weaponry and resources when formulating a defensive strategy against South Korea. Nuclear 
arms may be considered an ideal deterrent since North Korea can develop them internally and, 
upon completion, will remain a persistent defensive measure against South Korea. For these 
reasons, nuclearization is not considered a provocative behavior since the perspective of North 
Korean leadership is the primary focus. That being said, future research that incorporates the 
perspective of both Koreas in the process would improve the quality of the final product. 
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 Likewise, the data used in this thesis is largely incomplete due to the secretive nature of 
North Korea and the subject of study. North Korea is not a country that is open about its internal 
operations; its leaders and elites do not give unscripted interviews to the press or write 
biographies that are not a form of propaganda. As a result, most of this analysis is indirect and is 
based on the work of leading historians in the field of North Korean relations and unclassified 
information provided by high-ranking defectors. As a result, it is difficult to say with complete 
certainty what was the thought process of North Korea’s leaders, especially since two of them 
are no longer among the living. Second, this data set makes extensive use of reports that slanted 
to a US audience and are unclassified or declassified and there is no information on the authors’ 
Korean language abilities. Given the shared language and proximity of South Korea to North 
Korea, there may also have been historical provocations that were highly important to inter-
Korean relations, which may not be accounted for. Also, there may have been events, especially 
in the near present that are classified, but are highly relevant to the analysis performed in the 
thesis. Due to the incompleteness of the data, it is likely that additional information would 
change some of the conclusions. 
 As a result, future inquiries into North Korea from a historical or international relations 
perspective should include some form of discussion of the North Korean paradigm shift away 
from conventional military forces and the difficult that comes with discussing actions undertaken 
by North Korea due to the dearth of information as a result of the state’s closed nature. 
Enhancing the practical quality and applicability of further studies in the future demands 
improvement within these areas.   
 The course of my research also found that North Korea might act according to ideological 
reasons rather than overtly cultural or civilizational ones. This finding is useful in the future 
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study of North Korean behavior even outside of the context of overtly hostile military actions. If 
North Korea acts according to a set of beliefs, possessing a deeper understanding of these 
convictions is imperative in predicting how they are likely to respond. Since North Korea also 
appears to be highly driven by its leadership, it may also be useful to disaggregate the profile of a 
constraint challenger to see which aspects of that profile drive the leader’s actions vis-à-vis other 
parts, e.g. the role of nationalism versus the need for power. From there, it would be highly 
useful to see how much the predictive aspects apply to non-constraint challenging leaders to 
determine if these traits are passed across generations of leadership. 
Implications 
 The study identified that North Korea has largely shifted away from the use of military 
provocations by conventional means, or non-nuclear ones, from the 1970s onward. This trend, 
which also correlates towards the end of Kim Il-Sung’s life and the decline of North Korean 
power and strength vis-à-vis South Korea, is worth noting because it suggests that the shift 
towards indigenous missile development is largely permanent for the foreseeable future and that 
military provocations are a secondary means of action. Therefore, policymakers should be aware 
that North Korea may see the expansion of its missile technology as a defensive mechanism, 
since it has used its military in times of strength with the intent to overcome the South Korean 
government whereas it has pursued the former as the declines in its economic fortunes became 
permanent. 
  Furthermore, this thesis also found that North Korea, at least in the cases of Kim Jong-il 
and Kim Il-Sung, are largely leadership driven from the success of the individual level variables, 
despite the differences in their styles as noted in the analysis section. While this is logical given 
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Kim Il-Sung’s longevity of reign, his removal real and perceived enemies early in his career, and 
his support from younger members of the Korean Workers’ Party and the military following the 
Korean War. His son, Kim Jong-il, gained power through success as a bureaucrat in the eyes of 
his father’s partisan comrades that held elite positions and was more willing to delegate authority 
to others that allowed him to distance himself from the policy failures that came through the 
famine of the 1990s.  The model of maintaining power in North Korea appears to have a strong 
influence on early successes, military or otherwise, and this may be a motivating factor for Kim 
Jong-un, especially in the present, which is only a few years removed from his official 
succession. Unlike his father and grandfather, he did not have the benefit of time to build himself 
up and may need some form of success against South Korea and the United States to establish a 
power base. Given the shift toward nuclearization outlined in previous paragraphs and sections, 
he may pursue these weapons to build success since it is an area, unlike military provocations, 
where North Korea has had more success in negotiating with larger powers. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect future provocations to be limited in nature in that they will be tied to 
specific conditions within North Korea or aligned with a particular policy issue that is important 
around the time of provocation. 
 The final implication of this that North Korea abandoned the policy of trying to actively 
reunify the peninsula and has shifted to more protective measures as it has been overtaken by 
South Korea in terms of its development and shifted away towards defensive measures, 
evidenced by the movement away from military provocations. It appears that the belief in the 
eventuality of reunification under North Korean leadership, a view held by Kim Il-Sung, has 
largely moved into an ideal rather than a basis on which to formulate policy. Instead, the regime 
seems focused more on its own survival and has largely been successful in that regard despite the 
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loss of vital economic aid from the end of the Cold War. Policymakers should realize that 
making moves that threaten the survival of North Korean elites will be taken with the utmost 
seriousness. Initiating any form of reunification of the peninsula should take the survival of 
North Korean leadership, as repugnant as their leadership has been, into consideration to 
maximize the chances of its success. 
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